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PROCUREMENT
POLICIES AND
PRACTICES OF DAIRY
MANUFACTURING PLANTS
IN EASTERN SOUTH DAKOTA
Part I. Market Structure and Behavior

ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT
AGRICULTURAL EXPERIMENT STATION
SOUTH DAKOTA STATE COLLEGE, BROOKINGS
U. 5. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, COOPERATING

This is the first of two reports
concerning the results of a project
entitled "A Study of Managerial
Decision Making and Procurement
Policies in Selected South Dakota
Dairy Plants." The second report
will be on managerial decision
making. The study was conducted
by South Dakota State College
Agricultural Experiment Station
under a Research and Marketing
Act contract for the United States
Department of Agriculture.
The authors are indebted to Dr.
Louis F. Herrmann, of the United
States Department of Agriculture,
for help and guidance in organiz
ing and conducting the study; to
Dr. Ragnar L. Kristjanson, former
Associate Economist at South Da
kota State College, for encourage
ment and advice in organizing the
study; and to Dr. Carl Wilson, for
mer Associate Professor of Speech,
South Dakota State College, for
his able assistance in the survey
of the literature and construction
of the questionnaire.
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PROCUREMENT POLICIES
and PRACTICES oJ DAIRY
MANUFACTURING PLANTS
in eastern South Dakota

Part I. Market Structure and Behavior
By RALPH E. NELSON and TRAVIS W. MANNING1 ·
processing and marketing costs af
fect the share of the consumer
dollar that accrues to the producer.
Consumers also have a vital inter
est in the way the dairy marketing
system performs its functions. The
price, choice, quality, and avail
ability of dairy products are de
termined by the performance of
the dairy marketing syste_m.
. The dairy marketing system in
South Dakota has been undergo
ing rapid changes during the past
three decades. The major changes
are: (1) milk production has been
declining and in 1959 was only
70.0% of milk p r o d u c t i o n
in the 1926-1930 period, (2) the
disposition of milk by producers
has been changing and, in 1958,
25.4% of all milk was marketed as
whole milk as compared with 8.4%
in 1950, (3) the number of dairy
manufacturing plants has decreas
ed from 137 in 1933 to 63 in 1958,

INTRODUCTION

The procurement policies and
practices of dairy manufacturing
plants significantly influence the
efficiency of the dairy marketing
system. The strategic and tactical
decisions of plant managers in pol
icy formation and choice of prac
tices are related to the competi
tive structure of the market. Mar
ket structure, then, affects market
performance through its influence
on managerial decisions. A better
understanding of marketing struc
ture and managerial decision mak
ing should contribute to the im
provement of marketing efficiency.
The nature of competition--the
market structure and market be
havior--in milk and cream procure
ment by d a i r y manufacturing
plants in Eastern South Dakota
affects several groups. Producers
have a vital interest in the way the
dairy marketing system performs
its functions, both in terms of oper
ating and pricing efficiency. The

Assistant Economist and Former Econ
omist, Agricultural Experiment Station.
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and (4) the number of cream sta
tions has decreased from approxi
mately 1400 in 1933 to 219 in 1959.
These changes portray a dynamic
dairy marketing system in which
new procurement methods are be
ing tested and adopted. The de
cisions relative to procurement
conduct of the plants were made
within the structural framework of
the market.
Nature of the Study

The working hypothesis of this
study was that the structure of the
market influences the conduct of
the buyers and sellers in the mar
ket, which in turn influences the
performance of the market. Eco
nomic theory suggests some ele
ments of structure which affect
conduct and performance. In ad
dition to the elements suggested
by theory, each market probably
has its own peculiar characteris
tics that influence its behavior.
This study was concerned with
the following questions:
1. What were the structural ele
ments of the dairy marketing
system in South Dakota?
2. What was the conduct of the
buyers and sellers comprising
the dairy marketing system in
South Dakota?
a. What was the extent of price
competition?
b. What was the extent and na
ture of quasi-price competition?
c. What was the extent and na
ture of non-price competition?
d. How rapidly was new tech
nology ad�pted?
e. What unfair procurement

practices, if any, did the buyers
feel existed?
3. What was the performance of
the market?
a. How efficient was the mar
ket in reflecting c o n s u m e r
wants?
b. How efficient was the mar
ket in reflecting p r o d u c e r s
wants for services?
c. How efficient was the mar
keting system in relation to
known technology?
d. How progressive was the
market in the development of
new technology?
4. What was the relationship be
tween the structure of the mar
ket and (1) the conduct of buy
ers and sellers, and (2) the per
formance of the market?
Source of Data

This report is based on data col
lected from 60 dairy plants in 1957
and 1958, primarily through per
sonal interviews of managers. All
of the plants which procured man
ufacturing milk and cream directly
from farmers and were located east
of the Missouri River in South Da
kota were included in the study.
Information was obtained concern
ing the organizational structure of
plants, products bought and sold,
management characteristics, pric
ing policies and practices, procure
ment service policies and prac
tices, financial c o n d i t i o n s, and
amounts of milk and cream han
dled. Complete information was
obtained in most but not all cases.
DESCRIPTION OF THE MARKET

The term "market", like many
other terms used in economics, is

Procurement Policies and Practices

applied to several concepts. The
concept which seems most relevant
to this study concerns price for
mation and the forces which in
teract to determine prices. The fol
lowing definition seems suitable
for the purposes of this study: A
inarket is a sphere in which the
forces of supply and demand inter
act and the terms of trade are es
tablished for a product and its
substitutes. "Sphere" is used in a
general sense and includes the
full range of supply and demand
forces influencing the terms of
trade. The "terms of trade" include
price and other considerations of
value that are involved in a trans
action. A "product" denotes a goods
or service produced and sold by a
single seller. The market, in its
most complete sense, includes all
stages in the marketing process
from initial producer to final con
sumer; but to avoid undue compli
cation, the market may be treated
as a single stage in the marketing
channel. 2
Market Delineation

An important but often neglect
ed task in market structure analy
sis is the delineation of the sphere
in which the forces of supply and
demand interact and the terms of
trade are established for a product
and its substitutes. Markets have
traditionally been identified along
commodity or industry lines. Stud
ies of industrial concentration have
followed this approach and often
have misinterpreted the nature of
competition within a market be
cause the substitutability between

5

products classified in different "in
dustries" has been ignored. The
market for a product includes all
of its relevant substitutes. A major
task in delineating the market for
a product is the identification of
the relevant substitutes. All pro
ducts are substitutes in some con
texts. The relevant substitutes in
the present context are those whose
exchange may affect the supply of
or demand for-thence, the rela
tive terms of trade for--the product
under consideration. Inasmuch as
products and sellers are paired
under the market definition used
in this study, the identification of
the seller group is made simultane2Most discussions of price formation and
market relationships assume a simplified
one- or two-stage marketing process. In
the one-stage process the initial producer
sells directly to the ultimate consumer. In
the two-stage process an intermediary
buys productive resources from the initial
producer, combines them into finished
products which it sells to the final con
sumer. Some discussions treat the two
stages as separate markets-one a "factor"
market, the other a "product" market. A
three- or multiple-stage market is gen
erally conceded to prevail in reality but
it has not been adequately treated in
many theoretical formulations. The dis
cussions of three-stage markets often treat
the stages separately, concentrating their
attention upon the intermediate ( or "in
dustrial" market) stage. The treatment
of vertical segments or stages as separate
and independent markets poses some
grave dangers and it is tantamount to an
assumption of complete vertical inte
gration. Separate theoretical treatment of
factor, industrial, and product markets
can be justified on the basis of avoiding
hopeless complications, provided that
the inter-relationships between stages are
properly recognized. The danger of over
simplification lies chiefly in the empiri
cal application of the theory.

6
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ously with that of the group of For example, sellers h and i may
substitutes. The buyer group, in be direct rivals because of over
turn, may be identified in terms of lapping sales territories for substi
the demand functions for the prod tute products. Likewise seller j may
uct and its substitutes. The market be a direct rival of i but not of h
for a product, then, includes all oth
because their sales territories do
er products for which it is substitu
not overlap. (Figure 1). A price
table, all sellers who would be will
ing to sell the substitutes, and all cut by h may cause i to retaliate,
buyers who would be willing. to buy thus reducing the demand for the
the product, within the relevant product of j. Demand influences
range of relative terms of trade. may be transmitted from h to j as
The relevant range may be de readily as if they were direct ri
fined in terms of "normal" or prob vals. Such chain relationships may
able relative prices, services, and form a network of overlapping and
other terms involved in exchange. interlocking direct rivalry groups.
The substitutes for a given prod Each seller in the network is a ri
uct may be identified by means val, direct or indirect, of every
of a · mutatis mutandis cross de other seller. This system would be
mand function which may be cal A price cross-demand function states the
led "cross influence" to avoid con relation of the quantity demanded of the
fusion with the more common product of one seller to the price of the
ceteris paribus variety of cross de product of another seller, with all tastes,
preferences, incomes, and technology re
mand.3 This function measures the maining constant. The mutatis mutandis
full range of substitution effects, and ceteris paribus type functions differ
including the indirect influences in that the former assumes all other sel
of spatially separated sellers. A lers to have adjusted fully to each price
while the latter assumes all other
ceteris paribus cross d e m a n d change
prices held constant.
function reflects only direct in
The use of cross-demand and cross
fluences. It does not measure the supply functions in market delineation
indirect influences which are re has been proposed by several writers in
layed through chains and networks cluding Papandreou and Wheeler ( 15,
of spatially separated sellers. It im pp. 20-21), Cochrane (7, pp. 22-26),
and Evans ( 8, pp. 11-13).
plicity assumes either a point mar
ket in which all buyers and sellers Jt has been pointed out by Bishop that,
"In oligopolistic cases, of course, neither
have some mutual relationships or of these ( other prices or other quantities)
an areal market in which no price ceteris paribus concepts is even approxi
mately 'realistic', since oligopolistic in
influences are relayed.4
terdependence implies that other firms
The market group identified in typically
will readjust their prices and
terms of positive cross influence quantities in response to a price-quantity
of demand schedules includes all move by the i th firm," ( 2, p. 781). How
direct and indirect rivals of a given ever, he did not pursue the implications
seller and takes into account spa of a mutatis mutandis cross-demand
function because he was interested in
tial separation of buyers and sellers market classification rather than market
which is a common characteristic. delineation.
3

4
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h

-- ------/

.................

�-

....J

h, i, and j Individual sellers
----- Direct rivalry (positive cross
influence and positive cross
demand)
- - - - - - - - - - Indirect rivalry (positive
cross influence and no cross
demand)
Figure 1.

identified as a single market group
by cross influence whereas it would
be identified as a number of over
lapping market groups by a cete
ris paribus cross deinand. The
latter cannot account for the de
mand influences which are trans
mitted from one rivalry group to
another by sellers which are mem
bers of both. Consequently, it stops
short of defining the market broad
ly enough to include all the forces
interacting to determine the terms
of trade.
The nature of cross influence of
demand is as follows: If the cross
influence curve relating the prod
ucts sold by two sellers is constant
(a horizontal line) the two prod
ucts are independent of each other
and the sellers are not in the same
market. If the curve is not hori
zontal the sellers are in the same
market and are subject to common
forces of demand. Their products
are substitutes if the cross influ
ence curve slopes generally up
ward and to the right and are com
plements if the curve slopes down
ward and to the right.

7

For cross influence of supply,
the converse is true. If the cross
influence of supply curve between
plant A as a buyer and any other
plant is non-constant they are in
the same market group; and if it
is sloping generally downward and
to the right, their relationship is
competitive.
The delineation of the market
group of buyers can be accom
plished by identifying substitutable
products through the use of cross
influence of supply. In using the
cross influence concept it is neces
sary to select an anchor plant as a
starting point. 5 Assume that plant
A is the anchor plant and has four
direct rivals - plants B 1 , B2, B 3 ,
and B4 (Figure 2). Each plant B has
four direct rivals which includes
plant A and three C plants. Further
assume that: (1) the short run sup
ply of milk is completely inelastic,
(2) transfer costs are a simple lin
ear function of distance, (3) the
cross elasticity of supply between
each plant and its direct rivals is
-2.5, (4) the elasticity of supply
to each plant is + 10, (5) each
plant attempts to maintain its vol
ume of butterfat receipts, and (6)
each plant has the same volume of
� The word "plant" was used instead of
"firm" whenever reference was made to
the dairy industry. This was done because
( 1 ) "plant" is more commonly used in
the dairy industry when referring to a
creamery or cheese factory, ( 2) this
evades the controversy of whether a co
operative is a firm or only an extension
of the farm firm, and ( 3) two plants in
the study were owned by large corpo
rations, so the word "plant" distinguishes
the individual unit from the parent com
pany.

8
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in which a pebble has been drop
ped, until a new equilibrium was
reached for the entire market
group. If plant A maintained its
initial price change, the new equi
librium would find every plant
adopting the same proportionate
price change as plant A, each
plant would have the same volume
as the status quo ante, and the
c
profit of each plant would be low
er. The same response relationship
f -l -1'
would be valid if plant A had
c,-Bf
c maintained price and increased
its service. There would, however,
be
a greater time lag in response
_ f _l _ ,
to a change in service as will be
c, �Bf -c,
discussed later in this report.
The same response relationship
would be valid using various as
C3
sumptions about individual plant
Hypothetical Location of Dairy
behavior. Plants may act to main
Manufacturing Plants
tain volume as illustrated, maximize
� Cross Elasticity of supply
profit, match price or match ser
vice changes of any of their rivals,
Figure 2.
without affecting the nature of the
conclusion. Only if the direct rivals
plant A and plant A's volume would made no response to the initial
double. Each B plant would act change (which is highly unlikely
to maintain volume and would con if the cross supply is negative)
sequently adjust its purchase price would the indirect rivals remain
upward by 2.5%. Each B plant unaffected.
Each buyer in Figure 2 is a ri
would then regain 6.25% of its vol
ume from plant A and also gain val, direct or indirect, of every
18.75% from C plants. The four B other buyer. All the buyers are in
plants would have now regained the same market group.
The market may be delineated
the volume they originally lost to
plant A, plant A would have lost by identifying all sellers and buy
25% of its initial volume gain, and ers of substitute products through
eight C plants would have lost vol the use of cross influence. This in
ume to B plants. Group C plants cludes all the forces of supply and
would now act to maintain volume. demand which interact to estab
This adjustment-readjustment proc lish the terms of trade.
ess would continue, as ripples and
The use of cross influence could
counter-ripples in a pool of water result in a rather heterogeneous

butterfat receipts.
Suppose that Plant A increased
its price by 10%. Each of Plant A's
direct rivals ( group B plants )
would lose 25% of its volume to

r
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group of firms in the same market facturing plant buying milk and
and make an analysis of competi cream in South Dakota. The rele
tive behavior very difficult. In vant question is whether plant A
empirical investigations, it may be can affect the quantities offered
necessary to obtain a relatively ho �or sale to other plants by raising
mogeneous grouping of firms in its purchase price. The overlapping
order to facilitate analysis and the of procurement areas of dairy man
ufacturing plants in South Dakota
drawing of generalizations with re
indicated that contiguous plants
spect to the competitive behavior
would have negative cross influ
of the firms involved. Papandreou
ences of supply (Figure 3). In
and Wheeler do this through the
many local areas as many as four
concept of an industry ( 15, p. 56 ) .
plants procured milk or cream.
Cochrane found such a limitation
Figure 3 shows the procurement
useful in studying agricultural mar
areas of 58 of the 60 dairy mami
kets ( 7, pp. 21-39 ) . An industry
facturing plants in Eastern South
restriction would be less useful in
Dakota. It does not show the pro
other markets, such as the market
curement areas of (1) over 200
for steel. It would seem preferable
ream buying stations, (2) plants
to limit the scope of inquiry by ?
m the surrounding states, and (3)
means of some minimum cross
two large centralizers in other
elasticity figure rather than some
states which receive cream by
technical grounds which may be
truck and railway from South Da
unrelated to the closeness of com
kota. There was no plant in South
pe:iti:e relationships. A n y re
Dakota whose procurement area
stnct10n of the unit of study to a
did not overlap at least one other
group smaller than the market re
plant. This network probably en
sults in an exclusion of some of the
ompasses �ost, if not all, plants
supply and demand forces. This ?
m the Umted States which buy
.
exclusion may be offset, however,
milk and cream for manufacturing
by a more detailed analysis and
purposes. The network provides a
clearer picture of the role of the
nechanism within which a change
�
.
major forces. The use of an indus
m pnce or non-price policy by any
try concept or any other restrictive
South Dakota plant could rever
technique depends on the nature
berate until all the plants within
of the market and the purpose of
the network had been affected. The
the study.
plants within the network consti
tute the market group.
Delineati ng the Ma rket
A second relevant question is
For Ma n ufactu ring Milk and C ream
whether the market group includes
plants buying milk for fluid con
.The market for manufacturing
milk and cream can be delineated sumption. Would a change in the
through the use of the cross in purchase price of manufacturing
fluence of supply. Assume that milk by plant A affect the quanti
plant A represents a dairy manu- ty of fluid milk offered for sale to

10
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plant Z? There are no restrictions
against using fluid milk for manu
facturing purposes but the higher
cost of producing fluid milk gener
ally precludes producing it specifi
cally for the manufacturing milk
market. Milk produced for fluid milk
purposes commonly flows into the
manufacturing milk market when
its production exceeds consumption.
The flow, however, is mainly the re
sult of excess production rather than
in response to a price change.
Health regulations generally pro
hibit the use of manufacturing milk
for fluid consumption. However,
some producers of manufacturing
milk can meet grade A require
ments and can shift to fluid milk
whenever there is a buyer for it.
Again the shift might not be in re
sponse to a change in price of either

LEGEND :
I PLANT
2 PLANTS

_. .... ···

3 PLANTS

•

4 PLANTS

�111�1

Figure 3. Overlapping of procurement
areas of 58 dairy manufacturing plants
in eastern South Dakota, 1958.

fluid milk or manufacturing milk.
Considering the lack of short run
substitution between fluid milk and
manufacturing milk in response to
a change in price of either one, it
was concluded that cross influence
between the two was negligible and
the two products were in different
markets. However, the relationships
should be kept in mind and, for
other studies with different pur
poses, it might be desirable to in
clude them in the same market.
A third relevant question is
whether buyers of other types of
farm products fall in the same mar
ket group as plant A. Assuming a
long run increasing supply curve
for milk, farmers will, in the long
run, divert labor and other re
sources into dairying from alter
native enterprises which will affect

11
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the quantity of other farm prod fluid markets in response to changes
ucts available to firms purchasing in the relative price of dairy prod
these products. Consequently this ucts.
gives plant A a generally down
The total per capita consumption
ward sloping cross influence curve of milk and milk products has been
with buyers of other farm prod- decreasing in the United States
11:cts. However, due to the adjust since 1940. Using the 1925-29 per·
ment lag, the degree of influence iod as a base, the per capita con·
is definitely weaker than among sumption of milk and milk equiva
plants buying manufacturing milk. lent was 101.1% of the base average
Because of this gap, buyers of other in 1940, 97.4% in 1945, 91.6% in
farm products will not be included 1950, and 86.3% in 1959.
in the same market group as plants
In 1958, butter was the primary
purchasing manufacturing milk.
dairy product manufactured by 53
The market group for plant A in of the 60 plants in Eastern South
cludes all plants in the United States Dakota and 88.2% of the butterfat
purchasing milk or cream for manu used for manufacturing purposes
facturing purposes. However, this in South Dakota was processed in
study was limited to the 60 dairy to butter. The consumption of but
manufacturing plants in Eastern ter, however, has been decreasing.
South Dakota.
The per capita consumption of but
ter decreased from 18.1 pounds in
1910 to 8 pounds in 1959 ( Table 1 ) .
Demand Conditions

The demand for manufacturing
milk and cream is derived from
consumer demand for manufactur
ed dairy products. A change in
consumer demand for dairy prod
ucts is transmitted to producers
through the distribution system.
The prices of dairy products affect
the utilization of available milk at
manufacturing plants. W h e n a
manufacturing plant has facilities
to produce several dairy products,
decisions to channel milk into par
ticular dairy products are made at
the plant according to the relative
price of the various milk products.
Producers also make decisions to
market their product as milk or
cream and in some areas producers
can choose among creameries,
cheese plants, condenseries, or

Table 1. Per Capita Consumption of
Butter for Selected Years, United States,
1910-60
Year

1 9 1 0 ----------------------------------1 920 ----------------------------------19 3 0 -----------------------------1 940 -----------------------------------1 95 0 ----------------------------------1 959* --------------------------·-1 960 ,jj: ------------------------------------

Pounds

1 8.1
1 4.6
17.3
1 6.7
1 0 .6
8.0
7 .8

*Preliminary estimate.

The decreased consumption of
butter has been the result of the
general reduction in consumption
of fat-type table spreads and the
substitution of margarine for but
ter. The increased use of nonfat
milk solids has partially offset the

12
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decreased use of butter. However,
about 50% of the total nonfat milk
solids was utilized for human con
sumption in the 1920's and this
had increased to 80% by 1957.
In general, the consumption of
butter and fluid cream has been
q.ecreasing while the consumption
of fluid milk, cheese, and nonfat
dry milk has been increasing. This
change in consumption patterns
for dairy products should increase
the competitive a d v a n t a g e of
cheese plants and plants receiving
whole milk at the expense of plants
receiving only cream. Also, it is
expected that the decline in the
overall consumption of dairy prod
ucts would discourage new plants
from entering the market.
Supply Conditions
Dairying in South Dakota is con
centrated largely in the eastern
part of the state, with the greatest
concentration in the extreme east
ern counties; the Missouri River
acts as a general dividing line be
tween the dairy and non-dairy
areas of the state. In 1957, 87.1%

of South Dakota's milk production
was east of the Missouri River.
Milk production in eastern South
Dakota has declined in total quan
tity and in 1958 reached only 70%
of the 1926-30 average. This de
crease in quantity has led to excess
capacity of existing plants and
probably to increased competition
between plants for milk and cream.
Excess plant capacity and increas
ed competition tend to discourage
entry of new plants in the area.
The dairy manufacturing plants
in this study depended primarily
on local producers for their supply
of milk and cream. Six centralizers
received cream from a large supply
area through a network of cream
stations but the remaining 54 plants
bought all their milk and cream
directly from local producers.
Farmers have been changing
their methods of disposing of milk.
The amount of milk used on the
farm, the amount retailed by far
mers, and the amount separated
on the farm and sold as cream have
been decreasing for many years
( Table 2 ) . These decreases pave

Table 2. Percentage Distribution of Milk by Farmers in South Dakota and the
United States by Selected Year, 1930-1958

Year

Used on farms
S. D.
U. S.

1930 ---------------------------1935 ---------------------------1940 ---------------------------1 94 5 ---------------------------1950 --------------------------1 955 ---------------------------1 95 8 ----------------------------

23.0
24.9
20.l
1 8.5
1 7.3
1 4.3
1 1 .3

24.8
25.7
2 1 .2
17.9
15.7
1 2 .0
1 0.0

Retailed
by farmers
S. D.
U. S.
(Percent)

3.9
3.8
3.5
2.7
2.7
1 .2
1 .0

6.8
6.9
5 .6
4.7
3 .4
2 .2
1 .8

Delivered to plants and dealers
as whole milk
as cream
S . D.
U. S.
S. D.
U. S.

2.1
2 .2
2.5
5 .6
8.4
1 4.3
25.4

34.4
35.2
43. l
57.5
63.6
73.7
79.4

7 1 .0
69. l
73.9
73.2
7 1 .6
70.2
62.3

34.0
32.2
30.l
1 9.9
1 7.3
12.l
8.8

Source : Agricultural Statistics, U. S. Department of Agriculture, 1 959, and South Dakota Dairy
Reporter, S. D. Crop and Livestock Reporting Service, May 20, 1959.
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been offset by an increase of milk
marketed in whole form. This trend
has been more pronounced and
more advanced in the rest of the
nation than in South Dakota. It
has been in response to changing
consumer demands which favor
�ilk and solids-not-fat in milk at
the expense of butter and cream,
and government price support pro
gr�ms which have favored the sale
of nonfat milk solids. This trend to
whole milk marketing probably
will continue and may be accele
rated in South Dakota. This will
have the effect of further decreas
ing the number and importance of
cream stations, small creameries,
and centralizers while enhancing
the competitive advantage of
plants receiving whole milk.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The marketing of manufacturing
milk and cream involves many com
plex relationships. An analytical
framework is necessary for arrang
ing these relationships in proper
perspective for evaluation. Receiv
ed value theory was drawn upon
heavily for analytical tools and nor
mative criteria. The analytical
framework together with the theory
on which it was based are pre
sented here in order that the read
er may make his own interpreta
tions of the subsequent analyses
and evaluations. Further, it is
hoped that this formulation may
be useful in other empirical studies.
Defi n ition of Terms
Ma rket Structu re

The term "market structure" re
fers to the aggregate of market
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characteristics which influence the
conduct of buyers and sellers in the
market. Mason has stated that mar
ket structure "includes all those
considerations which he takes into
account in determining his busi
ness policies and practices" (13, p.
69 ) . Sosnick uses "structure" to refer
to "characteristics which constitute
a market's patterns, status, and
composition" (19, p. 386).
The term "market structure" is
used here to mean the aggregate
of those market characteristics
which significantly influence the
nature of buyer and seller conduct
and the performance of the mar
ket. The market structure concept
does not include everything that
may influence conduct and perfor
mance. It is restricted to charac
teristics which are peculiar to a
particular market and are related
to the conduct of buyers and sel
lers with respect to the transaction
process.
Ma rket Behavior

Market behavior includes the
conduct of the buyers and sellers
in the market and the performance
of the market. The conduct of buy
ers and sellers includes their mar
keting strategy, tactics, and prac
tices. Conduct can also be defined
as any action taken by a buyer or
seller to maintain or improve his
profit position via demand, supply,
and cost functions. The five gen
eral categories of conduct are: (1)
price practices, (2) quasi-price
practices, (3) non-price practices,
( 4 ) unethical practices, and ( 5 )
adoption of technology. Price prac
tices refer to maintaining or im-
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proving one's profit p o s i t i o n of another seller ( or bu\yer 1Jis-a
through price manipulation. Quasi vis another buyer ) is called "power
price practices differ from price relations." The ability of a seller
practices only by degree. Included group to affect the market behavior
are practices such as absorption of of a buyer group (or vice versa)
hauling costs, and rebates or re is called "balance of power."
funds that can readily be given a
Power relations among sellers or
monetary value but are not a part buyers may be classified as (1) iso
o'f the explicit product price.
lated, (2) atomistic, (3) circular,
Non-price practices refer to per (4) mixed, and (5) complex. Iso
sonal, goodwill, locational, and lated power relations exist when
product differentiation. By unethi there is only one seller in a given
cal practices is meant any practice market. Atomistic power relations
considered unethical by the buyers exist if no seller in a market group
affects or is affected by the actions
and sellers in the market. 6
The performance of a market or reactions of the other sellers
includes the market results. Bain when making an output or selling
said that "Market performance re policy decision. Circularity exists,
fers to the composite of end results between sellers, when either seller
in the dimensions of price, output, can affect the other's volume by
production costs, selling cost, prod changing price. Mixed power re
uct design, and so forth ... " (1, p. lations exist when there are both
11). Sosnick refers to performance atomistic and circular relations
as "dimensions which represent the within the same group or when
realization of normatively signifi there are assymetrical relationships
cant 'economic' results" ( 19, p. 387 ) . such as "dominant-seller oligopoly."
Criteria of performance are nor Complex power relations involve
mative. The criteria selected for direct and indirect circularity. They
this study were that the marketing are typical of spatially separated
system should: (1) reflect consu sellers or buyers of imperfectly sub
mer demand relative to quantity, stitutable products, that is, of spa
quality and kind of goods produced, tial differentiation and "chain" com
(2) reflect producer demand rela petition.
The balance of power between
tive to services offered, (3) be
efficient relative to known tech buyer and the seller groups tends
nology, and (4) be progressive in to favor the group with the more
the development of new products concentrated market power. It is
related to the three general types
and techniques of production.
of price determination: (1) price
Ma rket Power
setting - if market power is un
Market power is the ability of equally divided between buyers
a seller or buyer to influence mar and sellers, the more powerful
ket behavior. There are two as The buyers and sellers in the market will,
pects of market power. The ability hereafter, be referred to as the "market
of one seller to affect the behavior group."
0
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group tends to set the terms of
trade; (2) price bargaining - if
market power is equally divided
between the two groups, the terms
of trade tend to be determined by
either individual or collective bar
gaining; and (3) price fixing - if
market power is extremely concen
trated and the public interest in
volved, the terms of trade may be
regulated by a governmental agen
cy. Scitovsky has pointed out that
"Trade at set prices is the most
common form of market relations
in our society" (18, p. 21).
Ma rket Relationsh i ps
Structu re a n d Behavior

Some economists feel that mar
ket structure at least influences
and possibly determines the con
duct and performance of a mar
ket. The classical models of per
fect competition and monopoly
both implied that market behavior
was a function of market structure.
A perfectly competitive structure
was supposed to result in a perfect
ly efficient marketing system that
equated supply and demand and
transmitted consumers' tastes to
producers through the price sys
tem, whereas monopolies were
thought of as inimical to the ideal
performance of the market. Schum
peter claimed that the classicists
neglected the development of new
technology as a performance norm
and that perfect competition was
incompatible with research and
technological development. He fur
ther argued that innovation came
from monopoly power (17, pp. 8385).
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The recognition of an area be ·
tween perfect competition and mo
nopoly has caused economists to
re-evaluate the cause-and-effect re
lationship between structure and
l::ehavior. Firms in the area of im
perfect competition are not the
passive participants of the market
that characterized the perfect com
petition model. When firms com
pete in small groups the action of
each exerts a marked influence on
the position of the others. Each
firm adjusts itself to a given mar
ket structure but is also capable
of changing that structure. Hefle
bower says that "the structure of
a market at a given time reflects
an evolutionary process whereby
firms come to acquire a workable
relationship with one another" (11,
p. 124).
The structure of a market can
reflect mistakes, conscious moves,
or past conditions. Consequently,
firms may be larger or smaller than
conditions of supply or cost would
warrant. The original structure of
the dairy marketing system was
influenced by attributes of the
product such as perishability and
bulkiness in relation to the level
of technology at the time of devel
opment. These are now built into
the structure.
Structu re a nd Power

Market power, also, is related
to market structure. In a perfectly
competitive market the individual
seller or buyer would have no mar
ket power while a monopolist or
monopsonist facing many buyers
or sellers would have a maximum
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amount of market power. For all
market structures between perfect
competition and monopoly the
market power of sellers and buyers
is less clear cut.
Measu rement of Ma rket Power

Hypothetically, power relations
among buyers can be determined
through the use of cross influence
of supply schedules. It is difficult,
if not impossible, to collect data
which can be substituted directly
into a cross influence schedule. The
concept, however, guides the in
vestigator to other tools of measure
ment which may approximate the
results obtained if data were avail
able. The measuring tool used in
this study to identify the direct
rivals of each plant and to measure
market power was to ask each
plant manager the following ques
tion: Which plant or plants do you
watch most closely in setting your
prices? It was assumed that each
plant manager watched the prices
of his direct rivals.
The answers to this question did
not give a complete picture of di
rect rivalry and market power be
cause the answers did not include
all competitive relationships. The
question only referred to price com
petition. and plants could and did
compete on other bases. Also, the
answers' did not reveal dormant
but potential competitive relation
ships. The modal number of plants
that plant managers watched in
setting prices was two. The modal
size of the direct rivalry group,
therefore, was three ( Figure 4 ) .
In addition to delineating the

direct rivalry group for each plant,
the answers to this question also
revealed the n u m b e r of plants
which looked to each other for
price information. This resulted in
an index of market power for each
plant. The index of market power
was calculated by counting the
number of plants which looked to a
particular plant for price informa
tion.7
PROCUREMENT POLICIES
AND PRACTICES
(CONDUCT)

The objectives of the procure
ment policies of the 60 dairy man
ufacturing plants included in this
study were to acquire a certain
and regular supply of milk with
desired quality attributes. The a
mount and quality of milk and
cream received by each plant were
determined by (1) the density of
milk production in the plant's sup
ply area, (2) the plant's procure
ment policy, and (3) the procure
ment policies of the plant's direct
rivals. Under these conditions an
�ndividual plant's volume and qual
ity of purchase would be influen
ced by the management's choice
of price, quasi-price, and non-price
services offered to the producers.
Price

Buying Strategies

Price competition refers to that
aspect of economic rivalry in which
';The data did not include plants in sur
rounding states which secured price in
fonnation from South Dakota plants. The
market power of some of the border
plants probably was grealter than thi,s
study indicated.
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Figure 4. Sources of price information of 59 dairy manufacturing plants in eastern
South Dakota, 1958. Arrows point to the plant from which price information
was received.

two or more buyers seek given vol
ume and quality objectives by
means of the price paid for milk
and cream at the time of purchase. 8
Dairy producers in South Dakota
had, on the average, two or three
outlets for their product. The mar
ket structure was characterized by
relatively few buyers in each di-

rect rivalry group and many sel
lers. The buyers were the price
makers and this made necessary
some type of pricing policy. The
most common pricing policy of the
8

Cash patronage refunds and absorption
of hauling costs were considered as quasi
price competition. None of the plants al
located its reserves to patrons accounts.
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dairy manufacturing plants was
average pricing w i t h localized
price leadership.
The managers of 49 of the 56
plants buying cream considered
their competitors' prices when de
termining their own prices. The
managers of 17 of these 49 plants
_set prices only on the basis of what
their competitors paid and the re
maining 32 managers considered
both manufactured product prices
and competitors' prices in their own
purchase price determination. Sev
en plant managers reported that
they considered only product pri
ces in the determination of their
own purchase price but four of
these seven managers did watch
the prices paid by their competi
tors.
Of the 49 plant managers who
watched competitors' prices, 39 re
ported a policy of paying the aver
age of their competitors' prices. 9
Six plants had policies of paying
above the average. Five of these
six plants were non-integrated
plants and they tried to keep their
prices above their competitors'
prices to offset the cash patronage
refund paid by the producer-inte
grated plants. 1 ° Four plant mana
gers reported policies of paying
less than their competitors and all
f o u r �ere producer-integrated
plants. These answers were veri
fied by the average prices actually
paid for cream during 1955, 1956,
and 1957. The average price paid
by the producer integrated plants
at the time of purchase was 58.46
cents per pound of butterfat in
cream whereas the non-integrated
plants paid an average purchase

price of 60.2 cents or 1.74 cents
more than the integrated plants.
The non-integrated plants used
price to offset the quasi-price and
non-price practices of producer
integrated plants.
The pricing of milk was quite
similar to the pricing of cream.
Six plant managers reported set
ting prices on the basis of only
their competitors' prices, n i n e
plant managers set prices on the
basis of both competitors' prices
and product prices, and eight plant
managers reported that they only
considered product prices. Five of
these eight managers, however, did
watch the prices paid by their com
petitors. Of the 15 plant managers
who considered competitors' prices
in their own price det�rmination,
13 had policies of paying the aver
age of their competitors' prices,
one above the average, (a non-in
tegrated plant), and one below the
average. Again their answers were
verified by the price data for 1957
which showed that the average of
purchase prices for milk paid by
It was not determined whether plants cal
culated a simple average, a weighed
average, or paid the same price as their
highest paying direct rival. This short
coming does not, however, impair the use
fulness of the results as they are used in
this context.

0

Dairy plants were classified into ( 1 ) pro
ducer integrated and ( 2) not producer
integrated. They will he referred to as
producer integrated and non-integrated
plants. The distinguishing characteristic
was that the producer integrated plants
returned excess earnings to the producer
on the basis of patronage while the non
integrated plants returned excess earn
ings to the stock owners.

10
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the non-integrated plants was $2.90
per hundredweight while the aver
age of prices paid by producer
integrated plants was $2.85. These
findings agree with the Wisconsin
study which found that "the most
frequently stated price policy was
that of average pricing. Out of 62
instances reported upon, 49 listed
it" (5, p; 15).
The most common method of
obtaining price information was by
telephone. Forty-two plant mana
gers found what other plants were
paying by calling the plant mana
gers. With the exception of dis
tant centralizers and cases where
plant managers could not get a
long with each other, the telephone
was almost the exclusive method
of keeping informed on prices.
Prices of manufactured dairy prod
ucts were quite stable so managers
did not have to keep in daily touch
with each other but telephoned
their competitors only when a
change in prices was considered.
Other price practices were more
difficult to imitate than the basic
price paid for butterfat in milk and
cream. The practice of paying a
premium for bulk milk could not
be duplicated, by plants not buy
ing bulk milk. Ten plants bought
bulk milk and nine of them paid
a premium. The most common pre
mium was 10 cents per hundred
weight paid by six plants. Two
plants paid 15 cents and one plant
5 cents per , hundredweight. Some
of the managers admitted that
these premiums were not justified
on the basis of present savings in
costs but felt they would be, justi
fied when all the milk was re-
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ceived by bulk. The premium was
explicitly thought of as an encour
agement toward an all-bulk opera-,
tion. None of the managers ment
ioned it as a competitive tool to
attract producers from other plants.
Many managers, however, reported
going into bulk because they were
losing their best patrons to other
plants which were in bulk.
Price at the time of purchase
was generally not utilized as a
strategic device for increasing vol
ume of dairy processing plants in
eastern South Dakota. The greater
efficiency of large producer-integ
rated plants over smaller non-in
tegrated type plants was not passed
on to , producers in the form of a
higher purchase price for butterfat
but rather in the form of absorption
of hauling costs and patronage re
funds. Non .:.integrated plants paid
a higher average purchase price
than producer-integrated plants
but this was a constant differential
used to offset the p�tronage re
fund paid at the end of the year
by producer-integrated plants. This
conclusion is in accord with the
findings of a similar study in Wis
consin which stated that "a much
more significant development was
the expression of the idea that a
mong certain firms competition was
allowed to take only certain forms
if it were to be socially acceptable.
Among these firms a plant manager
might occasionally resort to price
competition, but a good neighbor
would not. In several instances
there was evidence that the plants
around here are pretty good neigh
bors" (5, p. 17).
The findings : of this study and
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the Wisconsin study are in agree
ment with economic theory on
pricing. Galbraith says, "Most im
portant, where the number of firms
is small, a characteristic feature of
modern industry, interdependence
is recognized and respected, and
firms stoutly avoid price behavior
which would enhance uncertainty
for all" (10, pp. 100-101). Fellner
,9bserved in his Com p etition Among
the Few that oligopolistic firms
generally live in a state of quasi
agreement and the agreement is
usually confined to prices and not
to other methods of competitive
behavior (9, p. 182).
The small number of plants in
each direct rivalry group leads to
circular power relations and inter
dependence of price policy. The
circular power relations within each
direct rivalry group minimizes pur
chase price as a competitive weap
on. The interlocking of direct rival
ry groups encompasses the entire
market and renders unstable any
plan among firms to lower purchase
prices collusively. '.J'he local price
leader does not possess sufficient
market power to effectuate lower
purchase price but rather acts as a
reflector of market conditions.
The inability of plants, with cir
cular power relations, to use price
effectively as a competitive weap
on and the difficulty of collusion
among all . the pla,nts in th e. mar
ket enhances the value of ·quasi
price and non-price tactics as com
petitive weapons.

and payment of patronage refunds.
Thirty-nine of the 56 plants buy
ing cream had truck assembly ser
vice for their patrons. This included
31 of the 34 producer-integrated
plants and eight of the 22 non-in
tegrated plants. Thirty-six of the
39 plants paid all the hauling
costs, two plants shared the haul
ing costs with the producer, while
only one plant absorbed none of
the hauling cost. Most of the plants
did not have accurate assembly
cost figures so they were asked to
estimate these costs. The most com
mon estimate of hauling costs was
three cents per pound of butter
fat, the lowest estimate was 2 cents
and the highest was 5 cents. The
average estimated hauling cost per
pound of butterfat assembled by
truck was 3.27 cents. This average
was weighed according to the vol
ume of butterfat receipts of each
plant.
The relative burden of absorb
ing hauling costs was greater for
the 1 a r g e r plants than for the
smaller plants because the larger
Table 3. Average Absorption of Hauling
Costs of Cream by Volume of Receipts
for 51 Dairy Manufacturing Plants in
Eastern South Dakota, 1958*
Volume of rece:pts

No. of Absorption of
plants haulingcosts

Lbs. of butterfat

Less than 250,000 __________ 25

Cents per lb.
of butterfat
in cream

1.44
1 .95
3.02
2.80

Quasi-price

250,000-499,999 ------------ 13
500,000-999,999 ------------ 1 0
1,000,000 and over_______ 3

Quasi-price practices included
plant absorption of hauling costs

*The centralizers were omitted from this classi
fication because they d id not receive cream
directly from producers.
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plants received a greater propor
tion of their cream through truck
assembly (Table 3). The 38 plants
which received less than 500,000
pounds of butterfat had an average
hauling cost absorption of 1.62
cents and the 13 plants which re
ceived 500,000 pounds of butter
fat and over had an average ab
�orption of 2.97 cents per pound
df butterfat in cream.
Absorption of hauling costs was
relatively uncommon in the pur
chase of milk. Three plants out
of 22 absorbed the entire hauling
cost, five plants shared the cost
with the producer. The eight plants
absorbed, on the average, 24.2% of
the cost. The other 14 plants did not
pay any of the hauling cost.
One of the nine plants receiving
bulk milk for manufacturing pur
poses absorbed the hauling cost
of bulk assembly. The other eight
did not pay any of the assembly
costs.
Cash patronage refunds consti
tuted another type of quasi-price
practice. Refunds were paid in one
or more of the three years studied
(1955, 1956, and 1957) by 26 of
the 34 producer-integrated plants
buying butterfat in cream. The
highest average refund for the
three years was 6.3 cents per pound
of butterfat in cream and the aver
age refund paid, for the three years
by the 26 plants, was 3.65 cents.
The savings from the greater ef
ficiency of the large producer-in
tegrated plants were generally pas
sed on to the patron in the form of
a refund. The nine producer-inte
grated plants which received less
than 250,000 pounds of butterfat
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a year paid an average refund of
1.52 cents per pound of butterfat
in cream and the three producer
integrated plants that received over
1,000,000 pounds paid an average
annual refund of 5.49 cents (Table
4).
Eight plants receiving milk paid
a refund in 1957. The refunds rang
ed from 4.5 cents to 21 cents per
hundredweight of milk and the
average of the eight plants was
12. 1 cents per hundredweight.
Table 4. Average Refund by Volume of
Receipts for 33 Producer-Integrated
Dairy Manufacturing Plants in Eastern
South Dakota, 1955-57*
Receipts,
volume

Plants, Refund,
number average
Cents per lb.
of butterfat

Lbs. of butter

Less than 250,000 _________
250,000-499,999 ----------500,000-999,999 -----------1 ,000,000 and over________

9
12
9
3

1 .52
2.98
3.23
5.49

*One plant was excluded from these figures
because the greater part of its cream was pur
chased from cream stations rather than direct
ly from producers.

Four plant managers reported
that the payment of patronage re
funds by their rivals was the pro
curement practice which gave them
the most trouble. Many of the
plants usually paid their annual
refunds in December and the far
mers tended to rely on this source
of income for Christmas shopping.
In such cases, producers may tend
to overvalue rather than discount
patronage refunds.
Non-Price

Non-price practices include aux
iliary services and other procure-
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managers were not questioned as
to the cost of this service but an
estimate of four cents per hundred
weight of milk was made on the
basis of cost data from four Wis
consin plants (6, pp. 25-26).
Twenty-seven of the 56 plants
buying cream paid all the cost of
retinning cream cans, 26 plants did
not pay any of the cost, two plants
paid one-half of the cost and one
plant paid the cost if the patron
could talk the manager into it.
Forty-two of the 59 plants sold
1,
dairy supplies at the plant: 13 sold
tr'able 5. Classification of 53 Dairy Man- these supplies at cost while 29
Ufacturing · Plants in Eastern South plants sold at cost plus a markup.
Dakota by Method of Pricing Cream Other supplies such as feed and
Cans to Patrons, 1 958
fertilizer were sold by 22 plants
Number and all of these plants sold at cost
o_
of_p_r_
ic_
g ______ o_
la_
M_e_
nts plus a markup. These supplies may
th_
d._
_ f_p_
:, n_
_
be handled as a service to the
No charge ---------------------------------------- 27
patron or as a means to increase
At cost --------------------------------------------- 1 7
Cost plus a markup________________________ 7
the plant's profit. It is reasonable
Plant buys every other can______________ 2
to assume, however, that a patron
Total ------------------------------------------------ 53
would be a more loyal cream or
milk supplier if he also purchased
The practice of providing free cans his feed, fertilizer, or dairy sup
to patrons was not as prevalent for plies at the same plant.
milk and only seven of the 22
Furnishing buttermilk or whey
plants buying, manufacturing milk to the patrons was a common prac
used this practice (Table 6). The tice. Forty-four of the 56 plants
manufacturing b u t t e r furnished
Table 6. Classification of 22 Dairy Man buttermilk to patrons but only
ufacturing Plants in Eastern South three plants did not charge for
Dakota by Method of Pricing Milk Cans it. The other 41 plants charged
_to Patrons, 1 958
a nominal price. Three of the five
Number plants manufacturing cheese fur
of plan ts nished whey to the patrons and
Method of pricing
all three plants gave it away.
No charge -------------------------------------·-- 7
The managers of 41 of the 42
At cost ________ ------------------------------------- 6
Cost plus a markup________________________ 2
plants that provided assemblr ser
Plant buys every other can ______ c_______ 2
vice reported that their haulers ad
Plant rents cans to patrons ______________ 5
vised the patrons on quality prob
22
T9.t�d
lems and the haulers of 17 plants

merit practices not classified as
price or quasi-price practices. Insofar as these factors, whether real
or fancied, vary from plant to plant,
the plants are differentiated in the
eyes of the sellers and they develop
preferences among the various
plants: These preferences reduce
producers' responses to price and
quasi:price practices.
Fifty-three of the 56 plants fur "'
nished cans to cream ' patrons.
Twenty-seven of these plants did
not charge for the cans (Table 5).

0__
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advised the patrons on production
problems. The haulers of all 42
plants delivered dairy or farm sup
plies to patrons and four plant
managers reported that their haul
ers would deliver groceries to pa
trons on special request.
A more significant, but less com
mon practice, was the making of
loans to patrons. Eight plants made
direct loans to patrons. Five of
these lent for the purpose of pur
chasing can coolers for milk. They
deducted the payments from the
milk checks. This seemed to be
a method of converting cream pa
trons to milk patrons.
Cosigning notes for patrons and
taking the payments out of the
cream or milk check was a com
petitive practice of nine plants. The
larger producer-integrated plants
were more prone to utilize this
practice as four of the seven pro
ducer-integrated p 1 a n t s handling
milk cosigned notes for the pur
chase of bulk tanks and two other
producer-integrated plants cosign
ed notes for can coolers. Two non
integrated plants engaged in this
competitive practice.
Loaning money to patrons or co
signing a patron's promissory note
was an effective method of holding
a patron and rendering the patron
less sensitive to price or service
differentiation. A similar practice,
which has been started by two or
three plants since this study was
completed, is a lease arrangement
for bulk tanks. The lease arrange
ment has the same effect as a mar
keting agreement with a single
plant and probably binds the pa-
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trons closer to a given plant than
does a cosigned ;note.
Only two plants in . southeast
South Dakota maintained contact
with the patrons through a news
letter. The Wisconsin study . found
that this was a common competi
tive device, but the plants included
in that study were much larger
( 5, p. 32 ) . A plant newsletter prob
ably becomes more _important as a
competitive tool when plants be
come larger and the relationship�
between the plant management and
the patrons becomes more imper
sonal.
Six plants offered group insur
ance plans for patrons. Five of
these six were milk receiving phmts.
The same services tend to be
adopted by contiguous plants. Th�
practice of furnishing free .cream
cans to patrons was followed by

Figure 5. Location of dairy manufac
turing plants in eastern SouJh D.akota
according to method of pricing .�rtam
cans to patrons, 1958. Circle with. dots
in center indicates free qfa)Il ,cans;
plain circle indicates other lileqiod :Pf
pricing cream cans.
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81.2% of the plants in the south
east part of the area while only
16.7% of the plants in the north
west section of the area followed
this practice (Figure 5). If the
area was divided into an eastern
and a western section, it was found
that 73. 1% of the plants in the east
ern section and 36.0% of the plants
in the western section furnished
free cream cans to patrons. The
practice of retinning patrons' cream
cans without charge was also most
common in the southeast district
where 75.0% of the plants pro
vided this service to patrons (Fig
ure 6). This service was provided
by 65.5% of the plants in the
southern section and by 29.1%
of the plants in the northern sec
tion of the area.
The practice of furnishing and

retinning milk cans to the patron
without charge was concentrated

Figure 6. Location of dairy manufac
turing plants in eastern South Dakota
according to method of pricing retin
ning of cream cans to patrons, 1958.
Circle with dot in center indicates free
retinning of cream cans; plain circle
indicates charge for retinning.

Figure 8. Location of dairy manufac
turing plants in eastern South Dakota
according to method of pricing retin
ning of milk cans to patrons, 1958.
Circle with dot in center indicates free
retinning of milk cans; plain circle indi
cates charge for retinning of milk cans.

Figure 7. Location of dairy manufac
turing plants in eastern South Dakota
according to method of pricing milk
cans to patrons, 1958. Circlctwith dot in
center indicates free milk cans; plain cir
cle, other method of pricing milk cans.
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in the northeast section of the
state. (Figures 7 and 8). Two
cheese manufacturing plants in
this area have provided this ser
vice so when the neighboring but
ter manufacturing plants started
receiving milk they also adopted
these two services. The practice
has not, however, spread beyond
this area.
Some services offered by plants
can be provided at little or no
cost to the plant. Examples of these
were the services provided by haul
ers, such as advising patrons on
quality and production problems,
and delivering farm supplies or
groceries to patrons. Other services
that cost very little were selling
supplies at cost price, cosigning
notes, publishing a newsletter or
offering group insurance. Some ser-

vices, such as providing free cans,
retinning cans free, and having a
quality fieldman, cost more and
must be paid from an increased
processing and marketing margin.
The p 1 a n t s, in continuing these
services, may have felt that these
services were a more effective way
to increase and stabilize volume
than to eliminate the services and
pay a higher price. There are two
advantages to competing on a ser
vice rather than on a price basis.
First, the direct rivals are more
sensitive to changes in price and
can retaliate faster and also are
more likely to meet the price
change thus nullifying the effects of
a price change. Forty-nine of the
56 plants buying cream reported
a deliberate policy of paying a
price relative to rivals and 15 of

Table 7. Li.st of Auxiliary Services and Service Score Assigned to Each Service
Name of service

Service score

Haulers advise p atrons on production problems ______________________________________
Haulers advise p atrons on quality p roblems --------------------------------------------Haulers deliver farm supp lies _____________________________________________________________________
Haulers deliver g roceries________________ ____________________ --------------------------------------___ _
Plant furnishes cans without charge __________________________ ________________________________ 5
Plant furnishes every other can without charge ________________________________________ 2
Plant furnishes cans at cost__________________________________________________________________________ I
Plant retins cans without charge _______________________________________________________________ 5
Plant reti ns every other can without charge --------------------------------------------- 2
Plant furnishes dairy sup plies at cost -------------------------------------------------------- I
Plant furnishes buttermilk to patrons at nominal charge________________________ I
Plant gives buttermilk to farmer with no charge _____________________________________ 2
Plant furnishes whey to p atrons at no charge ----------------------------------------- 2
Plant makes loans to p atrons_______________________�--------------------------------------------- 5
Plant cosigns notes for patrons---------------------------------------------------------"------ 3
Plant p ublishes a newsletter_______________________________________________________________________ I
Plant offers group insurance ______________________________________________________________________ I
Quality fieldman-full time _____________________________________________________________________ _ 5
Quality fieldman-one-half time _________________________________________________________________. 2
Quality fieldman-less than one-half time ----------------------------------------------- -I
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the 23 plants buying milk priced
it relative to rivals. Second, the
development of producer prefer
.ences by service differentiation
tends to reduce producers' sensi
tiveness to price and leads to mar
keting habits and inertia on the
part of the patron which tends to
stabilize the volume of a plant.
Five plants had full time quality
fieldmen and 16 other plants had
quality fieldmen on less than a
full time basis.
The auxiliary services were as
signed points based on their ap
parent usefulness relative to reach
ing the volume goals of the plant
management (Table 7). These ser
vice scores are somewhat arbi
trary and their significance should
be interpreted with caution. How
ever, some sort of service score
technique was necessary to reduce
the complex of services to manage
able proportions. The service scores
were summed for each plant to
obtain a rough index of the mag
nitudes of auxiliary services pro
vided.
U nethical P ra ctices

Concepts of fair competition and
unfair competition are employed
frequently in connection with com
petitive practices. Such concepts
are usually based on ethical con
sideratiqns and on the common
practice§ of the trade. Attempts
have been made by law to define
and eliminate unfair competition.
The National Recovery Act (NRA)
provided "codes of fair competi
tion," many states have passed a
"fair trade law," and the Federal
Trade Commission makes rulings
on unfair competition.

No attempt was made in this
study to define "unfair" and "un
ethical" competition. Each plant
manager was asked: Do you con
sider any of your competitors' prac
tices unethical? What are they? Do
you feel that competition has forced
you to use similar practices? If so,
which ones and why?
Thirty-one of 59 plant managers
considered one or more of their
competitors' practices "unethical."
Thirteen managers felt that their
competitors' testing practices were
"unethical," ten managers felt that
their competitors' grading stand
ards were "unethical," and four
managers mentioned their competi
tors' weighing methods as "unethi
cal" (Table 8).
It is evident that some managers
tended to regard as "unethical" any
Table 8. Number of Eastern South Da
kota Dairy Manufacturing Plant Man
agers Reporting Certain Competitors'
Practices as Unethical, 1958

Type of practice

No. of plant
managers
reporting
practice as
unethical

Manipulation of test_______________________
Irreg ular gradin g ____________________________
Irregular wei ghing_________________________
Differential pricing_________________________
Pay too hig h a price_______________________
S p read false rumors_______________________
Do not agree on p rice______________________
Cooperatives do not pay income tax
Assembling milk by truck in another p lant's territory*_______________

13
10
4
3
3
3
2
1

*The plant that listed this practice was not re
ceiving milk.
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competitive practice that hurts
them. Some practices which were
listed as "unethical" were only
changes in the status quo and are
necessary competitive practices for
a dynamic dairy marketing system.
Three managers reported that
they had been influenced by com
petition to adopt similar "unethi
cal" practices. The three "unethi
cal " practices were ( 1 ) loose grad
ing of cream, (2) manipulation of
test, and (3) paying a higher price
than the product was worth.
Most of the practices which the
managers considered unethical were
aimed at destroying competition
and thus lessen the efficiency of
the price system ih allocating re
sources according to consumer de
mand. These practices are inimical
to the interests of both consumers
and producers. The manipulation
of tests, weights, and grades makes
it possible for an inefficient plant
to compete on a price, quasi-price,
and service basis with a more ef
ficient direct rival. Competition as
a stimulus to efficiency is thus
thwarted and the inefficient plant
continues to live under the um
brella of unfair practices. These
same unfair practices mitigate the
efficiency of competition in pro
tecting various economic groups
against exploitation. They make it
possible to exploit sellers as a group
to the benefit of the buyer. They
also make it possible to exploit one
group of sellers to the benefit of
another group. Differential pricing
between patrons is another form of
exploitation of one patron vis-a-vis
another patron.
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Weig hing and Testing

The most common practice in
weighing cream was to round the
weight to the nearest pound with
the plant taking any weight up to
and including the half-pound and
giving any weight over the half
pound. Forty-four of the 56 plants
followed this method and one ad
ditional plant took any weight up
to three-quarters of a pound. Elev
en plants buying cream dropped all
fractions of a pound. There was
no major difference between pro
ducer-integrated and non-integrat
ed plants in the method of weigh
ing cream, 79.5% of the producer
integrated and 77.2% of the non-in
tegrated plants rounded the cream
weights to the nearest pound. The
11 plants that took all tenths up to
the next pound were somewhat
smaller than the average plant as
they had an average 1957 butterfat
receipts of 432,181 pounds com
pared to an average of 552,433 for
all plants in this study. The six pro
ducer-integrated plants that follow
ed this practice had an average 1957
butterfat volume of 555,583 pounds
compared to 284,116 for the non
integrated plants. The 11 plants
that followed this practice paid an
average total price of 63.40 cents
per pound of butterfat compared
to the same average price, 63.40
cents, for all plants in the study.
Rounding pounds of milk to the
nearest pound was also the most
common method of weighing milk
as 14 out of 22 plants used this
method. E i g h t plants dropped
tenths of a pound in weighing milk.
Six of these plants were producer-
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integrated and two were non-inte
grated plants. The producer-inte
grated plants which followed this
practice, from which price informa
tion was available, paid an average
price of $3.04 per hundredweight
of milk compared to an average
price of $3.03 for all non-integrated
type plants.
The managers of 45 of the 56
plants buying cream reported that
in testing cream they rounded the
test to the nearest whole or frac
tional percentage. There was no
marked difference between pro
ducer-integrated and non-integra
ed plants in the method of testing,
82.4% of the producer-integrated
plants and 77.2% of the non-inte
grated plants read fat tests to the
nearest whole or fractional percent
age. Eleven plants dropped all frac
tions of a percent in reading fat
tests. The average 1957 volume of
these 11 plants was 397,893 pounds
of butterfat which was below the
average of 552,433 pounds for all
plants but the average total price
of 63.77 cents per pound of butter
fat paid by these 11 plants was
slightly above the. average price of
63.40 cents paid by the 56 plants.
Assuming an average cream test
of 30.5% . butterfat, a plant that
dropped all fractions in testing
cream would receive 1.6% more
butterfat than it paid for. If this
advantage was paid out in the
form of higher prices, this plant
could pay 1.01 cents more per
pound of butterfat based on butter
fat price of 63.40 cents. The fact
that the 11 plants which followed
this practice were smaller than
average but paid a slightly higher

than average price may indicate
that this testing method was being
used to enable the plant to pay
a higher butterfat price. In the
case of the producer-integrated
plant paying an agreed purchase
price, this increment would in
crease the annual refund.
Nineteen of the 22 plants buy
ing milk rounded milk tests to the
nearest tenth of one percent and
three plants dropped milk tests to
the next lowest tenth.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
STRUCTURE AND CONDUCT
Market structures often are des
cribed in terms of a few major
elements which are believed to
account for most market behavior.
The elements which are mt:>h com
monly discussed are number of
firms, size of firms, differentiation,
and ease of entry and exit. The
complex behavior of the market
for manufacturing milk and cream
cannot be explained adequately in
such simple terms. Eight structural
elements were identified that seem
ed to have a significant influence
on the behavior of the market.
These were product characteristics,
service characteristics, numbers of
buyers and sellers, size of buyers
and sellers, spatial characteristics,
integration, degree of knowledge,
and ease of entry and exit.
Some of these structural elements
may also be viewed as conduct.
The structure of the market re
flects past conduct or past con
ditions that have become institu
tionalized into the present struc
ture and which influence present
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behavior. Sosnick says that "struc
ture and conduct overlap because
certain events can usefully be view
ed as patterns in some contexts and
processes in others" (19, p. 387).
Product Cha racteristics

The characteristics of milk and
cream affect the nature of compe
tition among plants and the bal
ance of power between the plant
and the producer. Whole milk and,
to a lesser extent, cream are both
bulky and perishable. They can be
shipped long distances or stored
for long periods of time only at
a high relative cost. These char
acteristics influence the location of
milk production so that areas near
centers of population produce fluid
milk while areas further from the
population centers, such as South
Dakota, produce milk for manu
facturing purposes. These charac
teristics, in conjunction with the
level of processing and procure
ment technology known at the time
of plant construction, account for
the spatial distribution of plants
within the area of production.
Raw milk, because of its perish
ability, does not lend itself to be
sold on an offer and acceptance
basis but must be sold on a pre
arranged pricing or pooling basis.
The low relative value of a can of
milk or cream also influences the
method of sale of milk and leads
to prearranged pricing agreements
and the acceptance by the seller
of a price taker role rather than
the role of a price bargainer.
There are objective standards
for measuring both quantity and
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quality of milk and cream. How
ever, adequate weighing, testing,
and grading equipment is relatively
expensive and few producers can
afford to own and operate such
equipment. This places most of
them at a disadvantage, particu
larly in testing and grading, be
cause they have little opportunity
to check the figures of the plants.
Notable exceptions are members of
dairy herd improvement and cow
herd testing associations. The un
equal balance of power between
the plant and the producer makes
it possible for the plant to use
its weighing, testing, and grading
procedures to compete with more
efficient plants on a price or non
price basis. Thirteen plant mana
gers asserted that other plants use
test manipulation to gain volume,
ten managers asserted irregular
grading by rival plants and four
managers asserted irregular weigh
ing. These beliefs may make mana
gers less prone to utilize price as
a competitive weapon because
they recognize that their price ad
vantage can be thwarted by test,
grade, and weight manipulation.
Producers also recognize the posi
bility of weight, test, and grade
manipulation which r e i n f o r c e s
their proclivity to sell to people
they "know" and "can trust." This
factor also tends to lessen price
competition and the Wisconsin
study inferred that fieldmen en
courage this distrust by attempting
to convince the farmers that prices
average out and by questioning
the operation of high paying plants
(6, p. 52).
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Service Characteristics

The basic service rendered by
dairy plants to producers is pur
chasing milk and cream. Nicholls
said that "a general class of <ser
vices' is differentiated, if any sig
nificant basis exists, in the minds
of the sellers, for preferring the
services of one buver over those
of another" (14, p. 198). The basic
purchasing service may be differ
entiated by location, method of
assembly, and goodwill. Locational
differentiation will be discussed
under the rubric of spatial char
acteristics.
Milk and cream were delivered
to the receiving stations or plants
by the producers ( stage 1 ) until
the advent of the truck. Some buy
ers then provided an assembly ser
vice. Assembly service has been
further differentiated into cream
assembly, ( stage 2 ) milk assembly
by cans ( stage 3 ) , and milk assem
bly by bulk ( stage 4 ) . The plants
in each stage of assembly have a
procurement advantage over the
plants in the preceding stage be
cause producers tend to switch
from hauling their own cream, to
plant assembly of cream, to plant
assembly of milk by cans, to plant
assembly of milk by bulk. Produc
ers seldom reverse the direction of

this trend so plants using a more
advanced assembly method can
raid patrons from plants using a
less advanced method with less
fear of retaliation. The plants which
assembled milk by bulk had an in
dex of market power of 3.00 com
pared with an index of 2.07 for
plants assembling milk by can and
an index of 1.07 for the plants
which received only door delivered
cream (Table 9).
An assembly service encouraged
the addition of auxiliary services
such as delivering farm and dairy
supplies, and advising the patron
on production and quality prob
lems. The 14 plants with no assem
bly service had an average auxil
iary service score of 2.5 compared
to a service score of 10.8 for all
plants providing an assembly ser
vice.
The marketing of milk, in East
ern South Dakota at the time of
this study included stages 1, 2, 3,
and 4. The 1957 butterfat receipts
in cream and milk were obtained
from 55 of the 60 plants in Eastern
South Dakota. The receipts of the
remaining five plants were esti
mated.
The estimated amount of milk
or milk equivalent received by the
60 plants in 1957 was 915,533,900

Table 9. Average Indexes of Market Power by Type of Assembly Service f�r 60
Dairy Manufacturing Plants in Eastern South Dakota, 1957
Type of assembly service

Stage

No assembly service __________________________________________________
Cream assembly by cans __________________________________________
Milk assembly by cans______________________________________________
Milk assembly by bulk______________________________________________

1
2
3
4

Numberof
Index of
plants market power

14
24
14
8

1 .07
.96
2.07
3 .00

<V)

O)

OO

pounds (Table 10). Farmers deliv
ered 43.3 percent of the milk or
milk equivalent to the creamery
or cream stations in the form of
cream ( stage 1 ) . Contract and plant
owned trucks assembled 35.9% of all
milk or milk equivalent marketed as
cream.
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The 1957 data did not distin
qui!sh milk received in bulk from
milk received in cans. Consequent
ly, stages 3 and 4 could not be
separated. It was found that 20.8%
of milk or its equivalent was mar
keted in these two stages. Plants
in Eastern South Dakota first re
ceived milk in cans and bulk in
November and December of 1955
and by 1957 about one-fifth of all
milk or milk equivalent was mar
keted through this medium.
Managers of plants receiving
bulk milk were called in June,
1959, and estimates were made of
percentage of all milk received in
bulk. According to these estimates,
18% of all milk marketed in East
ern South Dakota in June, 1959,
was marketed as bulk and 33%
of milk marketed to plants handl
ing both can and bulk milk was
marketed as bulk milk.
Goodwill is the relationship
which develops between buyer and
seller as a result of public relations
activities, personal contact with the
manager, owner, or agent of a
plant and past policies and practi
ces of a plant. 9oodwill constitutes
a nexus that d.es producers to a
specific plant even though other
plants may be paying a higher
price or offering more . auxiliary
services. In a business where "fud
ging" on weight and test is a com31
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monly suspected practice, produ
cers may feel it is important to
deal with people they know and
feel they can trust.
Producers become paired with
plants simply by reason of service
differentiation. Each plant has,
therefore, a partial monopsony rel
ative to a certain group of its pa
trons for as long as the plant con
tinues to operate. If this group is
not large enough to insure ade
quate volume, and it seldom is,
the plant is subject to competition
from other plants offering more or
less imperfectly substitutable ser
vices. This competition sets a limit
upon the exploitation of the plant's
"own" clientele because the plant
pays the same price to all patrons.
If a plant pays a price lower than
its direct rivals, it will lose· those
patrons whose preferences for that
plant are least strong. It is the pro
ducers who are responsive to price
and service differentiation who
cause circular interdependence a
mong direct rivals.
N u m bers of Buyers a n d Sellers

The numbers of buyers and sell
ers in a market are usually con
sidered to be the main determi
nant of market power. A large
number of buyers will find them
selves in an atomistic relationship
if no single buyer can significantly
affect the purchases of another buy
er through a change in price or
services offered. A small number
of buyers tends to have a con
centration of control of enterprise
activity within the market. This
generally results in circular power
relations because each buyer rec-

ognizes the interdependence be
tween himslf and his rivals. The
relative numbers of buyers and sell
ers in the market influence the
balance of power between the buy
ers and sellers. The balance of
power tends to favor the side with
fewer firms because the concen
tration of control is usually greater
on that side.
In 1957, there were 2,062 plants
in the United States engaged in
butter manufacturing, 1,194 in
cheese manufacturing, 3,395 in ice
cream manufacturing, and 1,654 in
c o t t a g e cheese manufacturing.
These plants bought milk and
cream from approximately 750,000
producers. In South Dakota, 60
plants purchased milk and cream
for manufacturing purposes from
approximately 32,000 producers.
These plants were inter-related
through a network of interlocking
direct rivalry groups. The power re
lations among plants were neither
atomistic, which the large number
of plants would suggest, or simply
circular which the small number
of plants in each direct rivalry
group would suggest. The power
relations among these plants were
complex - involving both direct
and indirect circularity. This will
be discussed in detail in the sec
tion on spatial characteristics.
The size of each direct rivalry
group was compared with prices
paid by plants within the group
to determine if the amount of com
petition within the group influenc
ed the prices paid. The small num
ber of firms in each direct rivalry
group indicated that the power re
lations, within each group, were
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circular. The size of the direct
rivalry group was compared with
the total prices paid for cream, by
the plants in the group 1 1 (Table
11). The highest average price of
65.20 cents per pound of butter
fat was paid by the plants which
only had one plant in their direct
rivalry group. The three plants in
this category reported that they
set prices only on the basis of prod
uct prices and did not watch any
other plants when setting the price.
The lowest average price of 62.62
cents per pound of butterfat was
paid by plants which had four
plants in their direct rivalry group.
There was no definite indication
that the size of the direct rivalry
gr�up influenced the prices paid.
Table 1 1. Average Total Price Paid for
Butterfat in Cream by Size of Direct
Rivalry Group for 37 Dairy Manufac
turing Plants in Eastern South Dakota,
1955-57*
Size of direct
rivalry group

Number
of plants

1 plant ________________________
2 plants ________________________
3 plants _______________________
4 plants ________________________
5 or more plants__________

3
8
7
10
9

Av. pricet
cents per lb.

65.20
63 .57
63.27
62.62
63.58

*Only 37 plants gave information on prices
paid to producers for butterfat in cream. Only
plants buying cream directly from producers
were included in this table. Plants buying
through cream stations were omitted because
their cost of butterfat figures included the
commission paid to the cream station operators.
tThe average prices are simple rather than
weighed averages.

The size of the direct rivalry
group was compared with the ser
vice score (Table 12). There was
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no consistent relationship between
the size of the direct rivalry group
and the services offered as measu
ured by the service score.

Table 12. Average Service Score by Size
of Direct Rivalry Group for 56 Dairy
Manufacturing Plants in Eastern South
Dakota, 1957
Size of direct
rivalry groups

1
?
3
4
5

Number
of plants

plant __________________________
plants __________________________
plants __________________________
plants __________________________
plants and over__________

5
14
15
11
11

Average
service
score

8.20
7.14
7.87
9.64
9.27

Sizes of Buyers and Sellers

Size, in this context, is largely
a matter of the degree of finan
cial strength. The financial strength
of individual buyers or sellers can
be measured by net worth, total
assets, plant capacity, net earnings,
or volume of sales and purchases.
These are not good criteria, how
ever, of the financial strength of
a multiple-unit organization. Some
of the dairy plants in Eastern South
Dakota were owned by large cor
porate chains and their financial
strength was not limited by these
characteristics of the individual
plants.
11

Total price inc�uded price paid at the
time of purchase, absorption of hauling
costs by the plant, and patronage re
funds paid in cash. Absorption of haul
ing cost was calculated by multiplying
the percentage of milk or cream volume
receipts by the ar1ount of hauling cost,
per unit of milk or cream, absorbed by
the plant.

34

South Dakota Experiment Station Bulletin 497

Net Worth

The 32 p r o d u c e r-integrated
plants, which gave net worth
information had a combined net
worth, in 1957, of $2,789,000 for
an average net worth of $87,156.
Correlation . of plant size, on the
basis of net worth, showed that
the larger plants paid a higher aver
age price to producers than the
smaller plants (Ta,ble 13). There
was a definite break in the prices
paid between plants above and be
low a net worth of $100,000. This
was probably because the plants
with greater financial resources
were better able to adopt . cost re
ducing technological changes than
the plants with less financial re
sources.
Table 13. Average Total Price Paid for
Butterfat in Cream by Net Worth for 25
Producer-Integrated Dairy Manufactur
ing Plants in Eastern South Dakota,

1957*

Net worth,
dollars

Av. total
price paid
for butterfat
Number in cream,
of plants cents per lb.

Less than 50,000____________
50,000-99,999 ---------------1 00,000-1 49,999 -----------150,000-1 99,999 -----------200,000 and over__________

9
8
3
3
2

63.54
63.53
65.64
65.89
65.96

*Complete price information was received from
only 25 of the 32 integrated plants.

The average index of market
power was .69 for the 13 plants
with a net worth of less than
$50,000 and increased with each
larger level of net worth ( Table
14). The two plants with a net

worth over $200,000 had an aver
age index of market power of 6.0.
Financially strong plants have more
firmly entrenched competitive po
sitions and would be better able
Table 14. Average Index of Market
Power by Net Worth for 32 Producer
Integrated Dairy Manufacturing Plants
in Ea.stern South Dakota, 1957
Net worth,
dollars

Number
of plants

Less than 50,000 ____________
50,000-99,999 --------------1 00,000-149,999 -----------150,000-1 99,999 ----------200,000 and over __________

13
10
3
4
2

Average
index of
market
power

.69
1 .80
2.00
4.25
6.00

to defeat a weaker plant in a
"price war." Price wars are seldom
used as tools of competitive strat
egy but the fear of a price war
influences the decisions made by
the management of financially
weaker plants. Some of the direct
rivals of the two centralizers which
were owned by large multi-plant
corporations were well aware of
their disadvantageous financial po
sition and the managers reported
that they "kept in line" with the
price paid by the centralizer rather
than risk a price war.
Volume of Receipts

Butterfat receipts for 60 plants
varied from 29,000 to 3,100,000
pounds in 1957 and averaged
522,433 pounds. Comparison of vol
ume of receipts with total prices
for butterfat in cream indicated
that the larger volume plants paid,
on the average, a higher total price
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Table 15. Average Prices Paid for Butterfat in Cream by Size of Plant for 26
Producer-Integrated Dairy Manufacturing Plants in Eastern South Dakota, 1 957
Volume of butterfat
receipts, lbs.

Number
of plants

Less than 250,000 __________
250 , 000-499,999 -----------500,000-999,999 -----------1 ,000,000 and over________

6
10
2
3

Payment for butterfat in cream
Purchase Absorption of Patronage Total
price hauling costs refund
price

58.55
58.59
58.64
57.39

than the smaller volume plants
(Table 15). Only producer-inte
grated plants were included in this
analysis so price differences due
only to differences in volume could
be determined. The volume of re
ceipts did not influence the price
paid producers at the time of pur
chase, indicating that p u r c h a s e
price was not a means by which
large and small volume producer
integrated plants competed. The
large volume plants absorbed a
greater share of the hauling costs
and paid a larger cash patronage
refund than the smaller volume
plants. The overall price advantage
to a producer to sell his cream to
a plant receiving over a million
pounds of butterfat annually rather
than to a plant receiving less than
250,000 pounds averaged 2.77 cents
per pound of butterfat for produc-

2.09
1.99
3.29
2.80

(cents per pound)

2.27
3.58
3.19
5.49

62.9 1
64.16
65. 1 2
65.68

Difference

+ 1.25
+ .96
+.s6

er-integrated plants.
Comparison of volume of re
ceipts with total prices paid for
milk indicated that, with the ex
ception of one plant receiving less
than 250,000 pounds of butterfat
annually, volume of receipts had
very little if any influence on total
prices paid (Table 16).
Comparison of volume of re
ceipts with service scores indicated
that the most services were offered
by plants receiving less than 250,000 pounds of butterfat annually
(Table 17). Many of the services of
fered cost little or nothing to the
plant and the low volume plants
may have felt that they could bet
ter afford to compete on a service
rather than on a price basis.
It was found that the larger
plants utilized higher levels of tech
nology (Table 18). No plants re-

Table 1 6. Average Prices Paid for Milk by Size of Plant for 1 1 Producer-Integrated
Dairy Manufacturing Plants in Eastern South Dakota, 1957
Volume of butterfat
receipts, lbs.

Payment for milk
Number Purchase Absorption of Patronage Total
of plants
price
hauling costs refund
price

Less than 250 ,000 ___________
250,000-499,999 -------------500 , 000-999,999 -------------1 ,000,000 and over__ ________

1
3
5
2

2.66
2.88
2.89
2.79

(dollars per hundredweight)

.08
.05
.15

.07
.06
.09
.10

2.73
3.02
3.03
3.04

Difference

+ .29
+.0 1
+.0 1
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Table 17. Average Service Score by Size of Plant for Producer-Integrated Dairy
Manufacturing Plants in Eastern South Dakota, 1 957
Milk patrons
Cream patrons
Number
Average
Average
Number
of plants service score of plants service score

Volume of
butterfat receipts

Less than 250,000______________________________
250,000-499 ,999 -------------------------------500,000 -999,999 -------------------------------1 ,000,000 and over____________________________
Total -----------------------------------------ceiving less than 250,000 pounds
of butterfat annually used bulk
tank procurement while_ the per
centage utilizing bulk tanks in
creased to 16% for plants in the 250,000-499,999 pounds of butterfat
bracket, to 33% in the 500,000-999,999 pound bracket, and to 50% in the
over 1,000,000 pound bracket.
The c o m p a r i s o n of volume
of receipts with the index of mar
ket power showed that market pow
er increased as the volume of re
ceipts increased (Table 19). The
26 plants that receiYed less -than
250,000 pounds of butterfat in 1958
had an average index of market
power of .42. The index increased
to 1.15 for the plants in the 250,000
-499,999 pound category, to 2.08

9
12
9
4
34

1 0.33
8.75
9.33

2
6
8
2

7.78

13.50
9.83
8.75
12.50

18

for plants in the 500,000-999,999
pound category while the eight
plants that received over one mil
lion pounds of butter-fat had an
average index of 4.62.
Spatial Cha racteristics

S p a t i a 1 characteristics are in
volved in the locational distribu
tion of buyers and sellers. Milk
and cream are produced on -widely
scattered farms and assembled in
to central plants for processing. The
costs of assembling the products
are such that plants tend to be
located separately, each procuring
from the area adjacent to it. Dis
tance affects: (1) the knowledge
which a producer has about prices
and services, (2) the confidence
which producers have in a plant's

Table 18. Percentage Distribution of 35 Producer-Integrated Dairy Manufacturing
Plants in Eastern South Dakota According to Size of Plant and
Level of Technology, 1958
Level of technology*
2

Volume of receipts

(Percentage of plants)

Less than 250,000______________________
250,000-499,999 -----------------------500,000-999,999 -----------------------1 ,000,000 and over___________________

10
17
0
0

70
33
11
50

3

4

Total

20
33
56
0

0
17
33
50

1 00
1 00
1 00
1 00

*Level I , door delivered cream ; 2, cream assembled by truck ; 3, milk assembled by truck ; 4, milk
assembled in bulk.
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w e i g h i n g, testing, and grading ly limit collusion among independ
practices, and ( 3 ) transportation ent buyers. An agreement to de
costs from producer to plant.
press prices w o u 1 d be difficult.
Spatial differentiation results in However, each plant has a small
complex power relations among range within which it can modify
buyers. The market group of buy price because of pairing of patrons
ers of manufacturing milk and
and plants due to service and spa
cream includes thousands of spa
tial
differentiation.
tially separated plants. Each plant
The limitation upon price manip
has some control over price in buy
ing and is, therefore, a price maker. ulation for plants with complex
The plant manager, as a price mak power relations leads the plant
er, takes into consideration the ac management to differentiate its
tions and reactions of his direct buying by means of services to sell
rivals so the power relations within ers. The services of plants in such a
each direct rivalry group are cir
cular. The effects of changes made market are, by the nature of the
by a plant's indirect rivals are trans market, spatially differentiated so
mitted through the direct rivals so buyers and sellers are not paired
the effects are generally attributed at random. Additional differentia
to the direct rivals. Indirect rivals tion of the products or services al
are generally ignored in making lows the plant further maneuver
decisions although a circular power ability in price decisions. Complex
relationship exists because of the power relations are conducive to
overlapping of d i r e c t rivalry swift movement of price changes,
groups. The power relations among rapid adoption of new technology
indirect rivals were "indirect circu unless artificial restrictions inter
lar." The power relations, in a mar fere with its adoption, and strong
ket with both direct and indirect preference for competitive prac
circular power relations, are termed tices other than price.
The spatial distribution of plants
"complex".
Complex power relations severe- also results in "ties" between the
farmers and the community where
Table 19. Average Indexes of Market the plant is located. In many com
Power by Size of Plant for 60 Dairy munities the dairy manufacturing
Manufacturing Plants in Eastern South plant was the largest employer and
was the "life blood" of the commu
Dakota, 1958
nity. Farmers may feel a respon
Volume
Average
sibility
toward the local plant or
of butterfat
Number
index of
receipts, lbs.
ofplants marketpower may feel an implicit guilt emanat
ing from "what the neighbors may
.42
Less than 250,000________ 26
think" if they sell to an outside
250,000-499,999 --------- 13
1.15
plant.
500,000-999,999 ---------- 13
2.08
1,000,000 and over______ 8
4.62
Local businessmen are also anx
Total ________________________ 60
1.52
ious to keep the creamery going
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and in three communities capital
had been raised from local busi
nessmen and farmers to form local
stock companies to buy out the
local plant which was shutting
down. These local companies were
not organized to return profits to
capital owners but only to keep
the plant in operation. When cer
tain farmers feel such a respon
sibility to local communities they
become somewhat insensitive to
differences in price or service a
mong plants. However, the ties be
tween a producer and a local com
munity are probably weakened by
the existence of assembly services.
The distribution of market power
is closely related to spatial distri
bution. It may be concentrated in
local areas despite "large" numbers
of "small'' firms in the group as a
whole. A plant's possession of us
able market power depends upon
its relative isolation. If it has a
large procurement area, a large
part of which is free from rivalry
of other plants, it may be able to
utilize a great deal of its power
in dealing with producers. In prac
tice, no plant has unlimited mar
ket power because of the over
lapping of procurement areas and
the threat of other plants expanding
into their procurement area. A
large discrepancy in the relative
terms of trade may encourage
other large plants to expand into
an area. Assembly costs are not
directly proportional to distance
and it is possible to haul milk con
siderable distances at low cost
once a truck has been loaded and
on a good highway.

Integration

Two of the usual simplifying
assumptions in price theory are
that each firm is a single plant
operation and that it is completely
vertically integrated so that pro
ducers sell directly to the consu
mers. In reality, there are various
degrees of horizontal and vertical
integration in different markets and
often within a given market. An
organization that is i n t e g r a t e d
either horizontally or vertically is
able to shift and concentrate its
market power in certain geograph
ical areas or in certain stages of
the distribution process. The mar
ket power of an integrated organi
zation is more effective because
it is more mobile.
Integration was quite common
among the dairy manufa<?turing
plants in South Dakota. Thirty-five
plants were producer-integrated.
These plants represented hori
zontal integration in the form of
collective action by producers and
vertical integration of the producer
to the processor level. These organ
izations cannot be classified as true
buyers although they did take le
gal title to the products they hand
led. They were agents of their
member producers and as such
they represented them in process
ing the raw material and selling the
finished product to wholesalers and
other buyers.
The previously discussed "rela
tive number of buyers and sellers"
becomes less meaningful when
most of the plants are producer
integrated. The relative bargain
ing p o w e r of producers was
strengthened in those areas served
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by integrated plants whether they
actually patronized the integrated
plant or not. The presence of an
integrated plant tended to limit
the market power of the non-in
tegrated or profit-type plant.
In addition to the 35 producer
integrated plants, two plants were
owned by large multi-plant corpo
rations and were horizontally in
tegrated operations. The market
power of these plants was respect
ed by their direct rivals because
of their greater financial resources.
The market power due to greater
financial resources is magnified by
integration. An integrated organi
zation has greater market power
than a non-integrated plant of
equal financial resources because
it can make profits at one plant
or one stage of offset losses at
another plant or stage of the dis
tribution system. For purposes of
analysis, these two plants were in
cluded in the non-integrated group
to distinguish them from the pro
ducer-integrated plants.

which manufactured butter. The
34 producer-integrated plants re
ceived 19,309,144 pounds of but
terfat in 1957 for an average of
567,916 pounds per plant. The 23
non-integrated p 1 a n t s received
10,440,341 pounds of butterfat for
a per plant average of 453,928
pounds. If there are economies of
scale in manufacturing butter, the_
difference in volume of receipts
between a producer-integrated and
a non-integrated plant should in
fluence prices paid to producers
for butterfat. This conclusion was
supported by price information
collected in this survey for the
years 1955, 1956, and 1957 (Table
20). Producer-integrated p 1 a n t s
paid an average total price of 64.31
cents per pound of butterfat com
pared to 61.26 cents paid by the
non-integrated plants.
The range of total prices paid
by producer-integrated plants was
from 60.41 cents to 66.67 cents per
pound of butterfat, ·and 80.8%
of the integrated plants paid an
average price within two cents
of the mean. The _ range of - total
prices paid by the non-integrated
plants was greater, ranging from
57.29 to 66.39 cents per pound of
b u t t e r f a t, and 54.5% of the

Type of Plant

The analysis in this section in
cludes only the 34 producer-integ
rated and 23 non-integrated plants

T�ble 20. Price and Quasi-Price Payments for Butterfat in Cream by 37 Eastern
South Dakota Dairy Manufacturing Plants by Type of Plant, 1 955, 1 956, and 1957
Type of plant
Non-integrated
Producer-integrated
Number
Av. price Number
Av. price
of plants cents per lb. of plants cents per lb.

Average p rice at time of purchase __________
Absorp tion of haulin g cost______________________
Patronage refund ( cash )-------------------------Total prices ---------------------------------------------

26
____
____
___ _

58.46
2 .45
3 .40
64.3 1

11

60.2 0
1 .06
6 1 .26
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non-integrated plants paid an aver- chased cream had an average ser
age price within two cents of the vice score of 9. 06 and the 22 non
mean. This indicated either a integrated plants had an average
greater variablity in the processing score of 6.41. Measured on an
costs of non-integrated plants vis- equivalent volume of receipts basis
a-vis producer-integrated plants or the nine producer-integrated plants
that s o m e non-integrated plants that received less than 250, 000
capitalized on greater profit oppor- pounds of butterfat in cream an
tunities. To eliminate, as far as pos- nually had an average service score
sible, variabilities in processing of 10.33 as compared with a ser
costs due to volume of receipts, vice score of 7.5 for the 16 non
only the plants which received less integrated plants in this category.
than 250, 000 pounds of butterfat
This study showed that the pro
annually were considered. 1 2 The ducer-integrated plants were more
average total price paid by the prone to adopt new technology
producer-integrated plants in this than non-integrated plants. Eight
category was 62.92 cents per pound of the 16 non-integrated plants
of butterfat which was 1. 76 cents with less than 250, 000 pounds of
more per pound of butterfat than butterfat volume in 1957 received
the average total price of 61.16 only door delivered cream while
cents paid by the non-integrated only one of the 10 producer-inte
plants. Furthermore, all six of the grated plants in the same category
producer-integrated plants paid a received only door delivered cream.
price within a range of their mean Seventy percent of the producer
plus or minus one cent and only integrated plants assembled cream
four of the ten non-integrated by truck while 44% of the non
plants prices fell within a range integrated plants were at this level
of their mean plus · or minus one of technology.
cent. The range of Brices paid by
An analysis of the market power
the non-integrated plants was from
of
the 60 plants in the survey show
57.29 cents to 66.39 tents per pound
of butterfat. Jt seems reasonable ed than the non-integrated plants
to conclude that plants receiving had, on the average, less market
less than 250, 000 pounds of butter- power than the producer-integrat
fat per year had similar cost struc- ed plants. The average index of
tures and some non-integrated market power of the 35 producer
plants were able to capitalize on integrated plants was 1.91 as com
greater profit opportunities by pay- pared to an index of .96 for the 25
ing a lower price to producers. non-integrated plants in the survey.
The average index of all the plants
In addition to paying a higher was 1.52. Ten out of 35 produceraverage total price the producer- _ __
This category of volume of receipts was
integrated plants buying cream proselected because ten out of eleven nonvided, on the average, more ser- integrated
plants were in this category,
vices to producers. The 34 proThere were six producer-integrated
ducer-integrated plants that purplants in this category.
12
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integrated plants and 15 out of 25
non-integrated plants had an index
of market power of zero13 (Table
21). With the exception of three
centralizers, all non - integrated
plants had an index of market
power of two or less while 68.57%
of the integrated plants had an
index of two or less.
Degree of Knowledge

The importance of "degree of
knowledge" as a structural element
is the influence it has on the bal
ance of power between buyers and
sellers. The general level of know
ledge among buyers and sellers
was not measured in this study.
A similar study in Wisconsin found
that "with few exceptions, mana
gers knew which firms were pay
ing highest and lowest · prices in
the area. There seemed to be great
price information among firms"
(5, p. 27). Plant managers are bet
ter informed for several reasons:
(1) they are trained to observe
certain criteria of market behavior,
(2) it is easier for them to obtain

relevant information, (3) it is cus
tomary for managers to exchange
price information regularly, (4)
they understand and have facili
ties to measure technical relation
ships, and (5) dairying is a side
line to most producers, so they do
not try to keep themselves well
informed about dairy marketing
conditions. P r o d u c e r s generally
have inferior knowledge about
prices and other relevant factors.
Even if a producer should know
that one plant has a higher quoted
price than another, he probably
does not know how their hauling
charges, value of miscellaneous
services, or their weighing-testing
grading practices compare.
Another Wisconsin study reportAn index of market power of zero indi
cated that at the time the study was
made no plant looked to that particular
plant when making price decisions. An
index of zero does not mean that a plant
does not have any market power-it does
indicate that the plant was not exer
cising any power at the time the sched
ules were taken.

18

Table 2 1 . Classification of All Dairy Manufacturing Plants in Eastern South Dakota
by Index of Market Power and Type of Plant, 1 958
Index of
market
power

Type of plant
Producer·integrated
Non-integrated
Number Cumulative Number
Cumulative
of plants percentage of plants
percentage

0
10
1 ---------------- 1 0
2 ---------------- 4
3 ---------------- 3
4 ---------------- 5
5 ---------------- 1
6 ---------------- 0
7 ---------------- 1
8 --------------- 1
Total ---- 35
----------------

28.57
57. 14
68.57
77. 1 4
9 1 .43
94.29
94.29
97. 1 4
100.00

15
5
2
0
1
1
1
0
0
25

60.00
80.00
88.00
88.00
92.00
96.00
1 00.00

Number
of plants

25
15
6
3
6
2
1
1
1
60

Total
Cumulative
percentage

4 1 .67
66.67
76.67
81 .67
9 1 .67
95.oo·
96.67
98.33
1 00.00
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ed that "opinions of sellers about
milk weights and tests tended to
bind them to their buyers and dis
courage changing to other firms.
In general, sellers believed they
obtained accurate tests and weights
from the firms to which they cur
rently sold milk but they suspected
or were uncertain as ' to the accur
acy of the tests and weights given
by alternative buyers. . .Such sus
picion or uncertainty discourages
sellers from changing to another
firm"' (4, p. 20). Another impor
tant consideration is patronage re
funds. A _ producer may know the
p�st --record qf a plant for paying
refunds, but he is very unlikely
to ·know what the current earnings
situation is and what magnitude
of price adjustment he may ex
pect, if :any.
The degree of knowledge is in
terrelated with the number of firms
o� ·each side of the market. Scitov
sky mentioned that one of the con
ditions of price setting is the inex
pertness on one side of the mar
ket which is characteristically the
side of. large numbers ( 18, p. 19 ) .
The efforts of the United States
Department of Agriculture, state
agencies, newspapers, radio sta
tions, and various producers' associ
ations help consideraply to inform
producers. A dairy farmer who ac
tively seeks to be informed may
have as much knowledge about
the market as do most managers.
However, the fact remains that
most managers are far better in
formed than most producers. This
serves to increase the balance of
power favoring the buyers. It is
also true that the better informed

managers have a competitive ad
vantage over their less well in
formed rivals. Many managers were
promoted from technical jobs to
management. They lack both for
mal education and business train
ing, and they do not know how
to obtain the information they need
or how to use what they have.
Market power tends to be increas
ed by better knowledge.
Ease of Entry and Exit

The ease of entry of new firms
into a market affects the market
behavior of the existing firms in
the market. The possibility of en
try of new firms into a market
group is a source of competitive
pressure. This pressure limits the
advantages that price makers can
derive from their market positions.
Papandreou and Wheeler say
that the threat of entry is greatest
when "a firm can become a mem
ber of a group on terms which are
at least as favorable as those which
are available to the firms which
make up the group in question"
(15, p. 177).14 They listed five
types of restrictions on entry. They
were: (1) terms on which tech
nological data and technologies are
made available, (2) terms on which
factors of production are made
available, (3) terms on which out
lets for the product are made avail
able, (4) consumer allegiances, and
(5) outright legal restrictions (15,
p. 179). Using these criteria as a
standard, new dairy manufactur
ing plants entering a market group
would find: (1) the methods of
14

The pertinent group in a market with
spatial competition would be the direct
rivalry group.
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Most of the dairy manufactur
assembly and processing widely
known and freely available to new ing plants in Eastern South Dakota
comers, ( 2 ) their manufactured were located in small towns where
products could be sold as readily there were few, if any, alternative
as the existing plants' products, uses for the buildings. The value
(3) no consumer allegiances to the of the building was, in many cases,
major proportion of its product, and very low in terms of alternative
(4) no legal restrictions. The new uses. Other uses for the equipment
plant would, however, be at a dis were limited also. A great part of
advantage in raw material procure the equipment was technologically
ment. It was found that producers' obsolete and, being highly specia
a 1 1 e g i a n c e s build up through lized, had no use outside of the
the years so producers tend to be dairy industry. As a result of these
paired with certain plants on the deterrents to exit, plants were not
basis of goodwill and locational leaving the market group fast e
preferences. T h e s e preferences nough to permit adjustment to
could be broken through paying changing production patterns and
a higher price or offering more changing technology in milk pro
auxiliary services to producers but cessing and assembly. The conse
this raises the cost of the raw ma quences of this "surplus" of dairy
terials over what the existing plants manufacturing plants was: (1) ex
in the group must pay.
cessive overlapping of milk and
Other factors which limited the cream assembly routes which lead
entry of new plants into the area to a misallocation of resources in
of study were the declining pro milk and cream assembly, (2) an
duction of milk in South Dakota inefficient size processing plant rel
and the larger optimum scale of ative to current technology, (3)
existing plants. These factors have a relaxation of quality standards,
led to a declining number of dairy and (4) an encouragement to use
manufacturing plants in South Da unethical practices to stay in busi
kota over the past three decades. ness. T h e s e three consequences
The number of plants in the were initiated by exit deterrents
unit of study was decreasing so but their realization was made pos
the ease of exit is, currently, a sible by other structural elements.
more pertinent element of struct
ure than ease of entry. Ease of
EVALUATION OF MARKET POWER
exit is contingent upon the oppor
AND PERFORMANCE
tunity to find alternative uses for
the investment in land, buildings,
Ma rket Power
and equipment. Plants unable to
Market power is the ability of
liquidate these assets at a reason
able price or unable to use them a seller or buyer to influence mar
for . other purposes are likely to ket behavior. Two aspects of mar
continue in operation as long as ket p o w e r were distinguished
power relations and balance of
variable costs are covered.
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power. Power relations concern the
ability of a buyer or seller to affect
the behavior of another buyer or
seller on the same side of the mar
ket.
Power relations among plants in
each direct rivalry group were
found to be circular with varying
degrees of influence exercised by
plants within the group. Generally
speaking, the greatest influence was
exercised by producer-integrated
plants receiving both can and bulk
milk. The least influence was exer
cised by non-integrated plants re
ceiving less than 250,000 pounds of
butterfat per year and receiving on
ly door delivered cream. In some
cases the power relations between
a large and a small plant approach
ed dominance. As measured in this
study the apparent influence of 25
of the 60 plants was nil. However,
these plants probably had enough
potential influence to merit classi
fying their power relations with
larger plants as circular but with
the larger plants approaching do
minance.
Power relations between a plant
and its direct rivals were indirect
circular. Plants were affected by
the actions of their indirect rivals
but the effects were transmitted
through their direct rivals. The re
actions of indirect rivals to policy
changes were not considered while
the reactions of the direct rivals
were considered. This combination
of direct and indirect circularity
was called complex power rela
tions.
Plant managers were cognizant
of the power relations between

themselves and their direct rivals
and also of the relative market
power of their direct and some of
their indirect rivals. Managers were
generally aware of what their mar
ket power enabled them to do and
what acts would be unwise.
The 1959 census of agriculture
reported that 25,075 farms in East
ern South Dakota had one or more
milk cows. The South Dakota Crop
Reporting Service reported 258,500
milk cows in this 44 county area
for an average of 10.3 milk cows
per farm reporting one or more
cows.
The power relations among these
25,075 milk producers were atom
istic. Each producer was a price
taker. He could decide how much
to produce and sell but he had
to sell at the price offered by the
plants. Most of the producers in
the area had two or more alterna
tive outlets for their milk and their
choice of outlet was made on the
basis of price, service differentia
tion, or auxiliary services offerd.
The distribution of market power
heavily favored the buying plants.
This resulted in price setting by
plants with producers taking a pas
sive role in the process. The fac
tors which enhanced the market
power of the plants vis-a-vis the
producers included the bulkiness
and perishability of the product, the
differentiation of the buying ser
vice, the comparatively smaller
numbers and larger sizes of the
plants, better knowledge of mar
ket conditions by plant managers,
and the relative difficulty for new
plants to enter the market. The
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effect of imbalance of power was
greatly modified by the prevalence
of producer-integrated plants.
Ma rket Performa nce

The performance of the market
can be evaluated only in light of
the things producers and consumers
want the market to do for them.
The standards of performance set
up in the study were: The mar
keting system should (1) reflect
efficiently consumer demand rel
ative to quantity, quality, and kind
of goods, (2) reflect producers' de
mand for services, (3) be progres
sive in the development of new
products and techniques of pro
duction, (4) maximize efficiency
relative to known technology.
The relationships among the
dairy processing plants seemed to
constitute reasonably w o r k a b 1 e
competition. The price paid at the
time of purchase was heavily in
fluenced by local price leaders and
was a reflection of market condi
tions. There was general uniformity
throughout the area on prices paid
at the time of purchase but less
uniformity on total prices paid.
Some non-integrated plants were
able to "shade" the total price paid
because they did not offer assem
bly service or pay patronage re
funds. The structure of the mar
ket, including overlapping supply
areas and the presence of producer
integrated plants, limited this price
"shading" to a few relatively iso
lated plants which had strong lo
cational or service differentiation.
The buyer-dominant b a 1 a n c e of
p o w e r resulting from imperfect
knowledge, inertia, and habit on
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the part of the seller also contrib
uted to "price shading" practices.
The total prices paid by the plants
were close to market value of
finished products less processing
and marketing costs. They tended
to reflect consumer demand rela
tive to quantity, quality, and kind
of dairy products insofar as they
were accurately transmitted to
them by wholesale buyers.
This study did not test the atti
tude of producers toward the ser
vices offered them by the plants.
Thirty-three of the plants were co
operatives and in these plants most
of the decisions relative to adding
or deleting services were made by
producer members or their elected
directors. It seems safe to assume
that the services offered by coop
erative plants reflect the wants of
the producers. In a Wisconsin study
dairy producers were questioned
about their knowledge and satis
faction with non-price services. It
found that "Patrons generally ap
proved of the non-price services
and public relations activities of
their dairy plants and believed
that having them stopped would
lead to little or no increase in the
prices received for milk" (4, p. 34).
With the exception of more inten
sive use of fieldmen, the services
offered by the plants in the Wis
consin study were very similar to
those offered by the plants in this
study.
The third and fourth perfor
mance norms concern the develop
ment and adoption of technology.
Technological change is envisioned
as having three components which
are (1) changes in techniques of
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produ ction or processing, (2) chang es in economic organization, and
(3) product changes. Technological change, in each of these components, has two ph ases . The first
phas e is innovational and covers
the pr o c ess by which ne w tec hniques or p rodu cts are dev elop ed .
The second phase is the imitation
or adoption of the ne w te chnol o gy.
Th� innovational activity th at
contnb�tes to a progressiv e dairy
marketmg sy stem is a difficul t area
t� assay. T his study w as not designed to measure innov ati onal activi ty but g eneral c o mm ents are
germane. Innovations in te chniques
of p roc ess ing are g enerally m a de
by e quipm ent supp ly comp anies
and state and Federal dep artme nts
of agriculture and exp eriment sta.
tions. I nnov ati ons in ec ono mic or �anizations are m ade by process mg pla nts, e quipm e nt supp ly c o mp anies, and experim ent stations. I nnov ations in ne w produ cts are made
by the larg er process ing pl ants in
the . m ark et group and exp erim ent
stati ons. It is, therefore, not nec essary for the dairy m anuf acturing
.
plant to mnovate in order to hav e
a progress ive dairy m ark eting system. I n f act, in mo st c ases
it
would b e �ne conomical for pl;nts
to eng ag e m research activiti es to
devis e a new pro ces sing technique
or ne w p roduct .
The a�op tion of technology is
e
fl
� ect ed m the eff iciency of plants
m the m ark et . C ertain m ark et charac teristic s s uch as larg e numb ers
and atomistic p o wer rel ations are
condu cive to the spread of technology. O ther market s tructures retard th e adoption of technology and

thus

circumscribe the efficiency of
plants in the m arket group.15
Certain struct ural elements in the
m arket under study were conducive to the rapid adoption of tech 
nology.
The large numbers of
pl ants in the market deterred collu
sion by all the plants in the market
grou p and the interlocking of di.
re ct nv alry group s rendered collu
� ion wi�hin a direct riv alry group
meff e c_:tiv e . T he interlo ck ing of di
rec t nv alry group s also p rov ided
the me chanism and p ressure f or
the spread of t echnology throughout the mark et .
O ther structural elements mit i
gated the pressure for adop ting
techno logy in order to increas e ef
ficiency. The s tructure of the m ar
ket m ade it p ossible f or inefficient
plants to continue in op eration. The
pairing of plants and producers due
to servic e and sp atial differentia
tion, and the lack of k no wledg e
on the part of th e producer due
to product and sp atial characteris 
tics, m ade it po ssibl e f or inefficient
plants to stay in operation ev en
though they p aid a l o wer total
price . These s ame structural char
acteristics also made it p ossibl e f or
:plants to. engage in irregular grad 
mg, testmg, and weighing p racti
ce s and thu s comp ete on a price
.
b asis: The �uspicion of irregular
gradmg, testmg, and w e i g h i n g
practices seems to have been prev a
lent enough to mark them as estab
lished practic es in s o me p lants and
the

1

:;Cf. Yal� Brozen ( 3, pp. 239-257 ) on the
d etermm ants of the rate of imitation of
technology. Especially rea d p a ge 244 on
the effect of ma rket organization on the
rate of im itation.
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real problems in the market.
The structure of the market also
promoted considerable overlapping
of assembly routes and this resulted
in higher assembly costs. The elimi
nation of overlapping assembly
routes through some cooperative
arrangement could lower collec
tion costs but might also lower the
market power of the producer vis
a-vis the plant. This latter short
coming could be eliminated if most
of the plants were producer-inte
grated plants. While greater ef
ficiency could be achieved in both
assembling and processing the raw
product, the existing level of inef
ficiency was not considered a seri
ous malfunctioning of the market.
SUMMARY
There were 60 dairy plants in
Eastern South Dakota purchasing
manufacturing milk and cream di
rectly from producers in 1957. The
procurement areas of these plants
overlapped extensively, forming a
network of direct competitive re
lationsips in which each plant was
influenced directly by a few other
plants and indirectly by all other
plants in the market. The direct
and indirect substitutability of pur
chasing services indicated that all
plants in the study, and possibly
all dairy manufacturing plants in
the country, were operating in a
single market. Likewise, the sub
stitutability of manufacturing milk
and cream indicated that all pro
ducers of these products were op
erating in a single market.
The dairy plants used various
strategies to achieve their procure-
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ment goals. These were classified
as price, quasi-price, and non-price
practices. Few managers u s e d
price manipulation as a means of
attracting patronage because of the
near certainty of immediate retal
iation. Most managers set prices
in relation to competitors' prices,
finished product prices, or both.
Thirty-nine m a n a g e r s reported
that they sought to pay the average
of their competitors' prices for
cream and 13 reported that they
sought to pay the competitive aver
age for milk. Most managers ex
changed price information regular
ly by telephone. They usually noti
fied neighboring managers before
making a price change. The num
ber of plants which looked to each
plant for price information was
used as a rough measure of its
market power.
Quasi-price practices included
hauling subsidies and patronage re
funds. Truck assembly services
were provided by 39 of the 56
plants which bought cream and
all of the 22 plants which bought
milk. Among the plants which as
sembled cream, 36 bore the entire
cost, two shared the cost with pro
ducers, and only one bore none of
the cost. Only three of the milk
plants bore the entire cost of as
sembly, five shared the cost with
producers, and 14 bore non of the
cost. Patronage refunds on cream
were paid in one or more of the
years studied (1955, 1956, and
1957) by 26 of the 34 producer-in
tegrated plants which made but
ter. Patronage refunds on milk were
paid by eight plants in 1957.
Dairy plants provided a variety
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of non-price services. Cream cans a significant influence on market
were furnished at no e x p 1 i c i t behavior. Product characteristics,
charge by 27 plants and at less such as bulkiness and perishability,
than the usual retail price by most fundamentally affect the way a
of the others. All of the milk plants product is traded. Milk cannot be
furnished milk cans and only two as readily stored or shipped to dif
charged the full retail price. About ferent marketplaces to obtain bet
half of the plants paid the costs ter terms as can products like wheat
of retinning cans. Most of the as and corn. Service characteristics
sembly truck drivers advised pa may cause buyers and sellers to
trons on milk production and prob become paired. This tends to limit
lems relating to quality milk. Less "shopping around" for better terms.
common services included making The basic service provided by
loans, cosigning notes, newsletters, dairy plants-purchasing milk and
and group insurance. Each of the cream-is differentiated by location,
services was assigned an arbitrary method of assembly, and goodwill.
value and a total auxiliary service
The number of buyers and sellers
score was computed for each plant. usually is considered a major de
Thirty-one managers reported terminant of market power. How
unethical practices by competitors. ever, power relations among dairy
The most frequently mentioned plants were not atomistic despite
were incorrect testing, grading, and their relatively large numbers.
weighing. Some pricing practices Some concentration of market pow
er was made possible by the spatial
were regarded as "unfair."
Most managers reported that in separation of plants which limited
testing for butterfat they rounded the extent of direct competition.
to the nearest percent or tenth The size of the direct rivalry group
percent. Most rounded to the near appeared to have no significant in
est pound in weighiQg. It was cus fluence on either prices paid or
tomary to take the lower of two services rendered. The influence
points if the reading was halfway of numbers seemed to be strongly
between them. A few managers modified by other elements.
reported that all fractions were
Size of plant (and of firm in
dropped in testing and weighing. cases involving multiple-unit organ
This did not necessarily result in izations) directly influenced mar
any inequity but it allowed them ket behavior. Two measures of size
to quote a higher nominal price were used in this study-net worth
then they were actually paying.
and volume of butterfat receipts.
Most of the literature on mar Average prices for cream were di
ket structure lists the important rectly related to size. However,
elements of structure as number there was little variation in milk
of firms, size of firms, product dif prices among size groups. Service
ferentiation, and ease of entry and scores were inversely related to
exit. Several additional elements size in the case of cream and there
were found in this study to have was no consistent relationship in
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the case of milk. There was a
strong positive relationship be
tween size and market power. The
plants with net worth of $200,000
or more had an average market
power score nine times that of the
group with less than $50,000 net
worth.
The spatial distribution of pro
ducers and plants strongly influ
enced market behavior. The plants
tended to be located separately
because of the need to assemble
milk and cream from comparative
ly large areas in order to achieve
reasonable economies of scale. As
a result, each producer had a choice
between only a few buyers. The
more distant the location of the
buying plant, the less the producer
was likely to know about its prices,
services, and reliability. The as
sembly areas of most plants over
lapped from one to five others.
Thus, each plant had only a few
direct rivals and power relations
among them tended to be circu
lar. However, the interlocking of
direct rivalry groups created a net
work of communication connect
ing all plants in the market. Con
sequently, the effects of every
price change tended to be relayed
rapidly throughout the system. The
resultant complex power relations
largely prevented both independ
ent action and overt collusion. This
left only two alternatives-tacit a
greement or price war. The danger
of price war caused competitive
strategies to be focused largely on
service differentiation.
The type and extent of integra
tion had a significant effect on
market power. Thirty-five of the 60
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plants were classified as producer
integrated and 25 as non-integrat
ed. Most of the former were coop
eratives and most of the latter were
independents. The average initial
price paid for cream was lower
for the producer-integrated plants
but the total payment, which in
cluded hauling subsidies and pa
tronage refunds, averaged about
5 percent higher than for the non
integrated group. The producer
integrated plants also provided
more auxiliary services to produc
ers. The average service score for
producer-integrated plants buying
cream was 50 percent greater than
that of the non-integrated plants.
The average market power score
for the producer-integrated plants
was double that of the non-inte
grated plants. The market power
of the producer-integrated plants
was enhanced by the fact that they
were the agents of the producers.
This market power tended to be
used for the benefit of the pro
ducers because the interests of the
producers and their plants were
similar.
The degree of knowledge affect
ed the balance of power between
buyers and sellers. No objective
measure of knowledge was at
tempted in this study but plant
managers obviously were better in
formed about the dairy market than
were most producers. Ease of entry
and exit also influenced market be
havior. The chief barriers to entry
for new plants were the high fixed
capital requirements and the pair
ing of producers with existing
plants. It would have been very
difficult for a new plant to obtain
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adequate volume in most areas.
The exit of dairy plants was cur
tailed for the same reasons. The
high fixed investment in highly
specialized equipment permitted
plants to remain in operation for
years despite net operating losses.
The optimum size of dairy plants
has grown much faster then the
rate of plant exit. Consequently,
most plants were operating far be
low capacity. Efforts to obtain
greater volume led to excessive
overlapping of procurement areas,
slowness in adopting new technol
ogy, sacrifice of quality, and en
couragement to engage in unethical
procurement practices.
It was concluded that power re
lations among buyers were com
plex-directly circular b e t w e e n
plants within a direct rivalry group
and indirectly circular between
plants in different rivalry groups.
The degree of market power was
related to level of technology, size,
and type of plant. Power relations
among producers were found to be
atomistic. The balance of power

strongly favored the plants. How
ever, the prevalence of producer
integrated plants and the efficient
communication of competitive for
ces throughout the market tended
to lessen the imbalance of market
power to a marked degree.
It was further concluded that
the relationships among d a i r y
plants constituted reasonably work
able competition. Prices paid seem
ed to reflect market conditions. The
overlapping of procurement areas
undoubtedly had an adverse effect
on procurement costs but, coinci
dentally, it gave producers more
choices among buyers and it tend
ed to inhibit overt collusion. Ap
parently, the services provided to
producers reflected their wants.
The development of new technolo
gy seemed fairly progressive al
though little of it was done by the
plants or producers. The rate of
adopting new technology seemed
reasonably rapid although barriers
to exit encouraged many technic
cally inefficient plants to remain
in operation.
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